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You are here: Home / Privacy / UK Proposing to Disconnect Those Involved in Piracy from the Internet

UK Proposing to Disconnect Those Involved in Piracy from the Internet

February 20, 2008

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Ok more controversy for you guys, and once again it’s the UK leading a new initiative. This time it’s not against making hacking tools illegal, it’s against people downloading ‘pirated’ content from the Internet (using torrent sites etc.).

I do hope they can differentiate using torrents to download open source software or creative commons music and videos from the real copyrighted material. They will be basically terminating any Internet suspected of breaching copyright through file-sharing. ISP’s who fail to integrate the initiative will be liable to legal action.

It’ll be a three-strike and out system, first instance a warning, second a suspension and third finally termination.

People in the UK who go online and illegally download music and films may have their internet access cut under plans the government is considering. A draft consultation suggests internet service providers would be required to take action over users who access pirated material via their accounts.

But the government is stressing that plans are at an early stage and it is still working on final proposals.Six million people a year are estimated to download files illegally in the UK.

“The content and proposals for the strategy have been significantly developed since then and a comprehensive plan to bolster the UK’s creative industries will be published shortly,” it added.

It’s pretty worrying I think, is the UK becoming a new homeground for RIAA and MPAA? Much like the US, land of Digital Restrictions Management (DRM). I think intellectual property and copyright should be taken seriously..

But perhaps they should look at the quality of music and movies the ‘entertainment’ industry is producing, the amount they are charging and do a bit of introspection. If a movie is really good people WILL go to the cinema. If an album is good (not 2 good songs and 11 fillers) they will buy the original.

The BPI, the trade body that represents the UK record industry, said internet providers had “done little or nothing to address illegal downloading via their networks”.

“This is the number one issue for the creative industries in the digital age, and the government’s willingness to tackle it should be applauded,” said BPI chief executive Geoff Taylor.

“Now is not the time for ISPs to hide behind bogus privacy arguments, or claim the problem is too complicated or difficult to tackle.”

I’m sorry but how is the ISP going to do packet inspection for every single packet traversing it’s network, then do some kind of hash check on a bunch of combined packets in a stream (only when it’s not encrypted of course) to verify it is copyright content. You can go dropping people from their ISP because they are downloading the latest version of Ubuntu using a torrent.

Source: BBC News

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Comments

  1. Pantagruel says

    February 20, 2008 at 3:33 pm

    This will only pave the way for encrypted p2p/torrent clients. I even doubt if an ISP will bother to go as far as deep packet inspection on th massive amounts of traffic they see. They will rather go for a simple blocking of known p2p/torrent ports/clients (some Dutch ISP’s are blocking nntp/torrent and such). The latter can be circumvented by using another port or the prior mentioned encrypted variants, no ISP will block SSL encrypted stuff .

  2. zupakomputer says

    February 20, 2008 at 6:34 pm

    Yeah, same kinda problems apply in trying to implement such a thing (even if it was in the region of being a good idea, which it’s not for a wide variety of reasons) as were being mentioned in the hacking tools thread.

    I like the angle ‘if the films were any good to begin with’ – in total agreement. I only rent films for something to watch when Freeview is rubbish. There’s rarely anything that good that I can’t wait to rent it; the fact I haven’t bothered going to see it at the cinema….
    that said – of course I prefer having originals of what I actually like. I’ve spent a fortune importing consoles and games for example and I still prefer to buy CDs – and when I get more room I’m starting/continuing a vinyl collection.
    Most films on wide-release went down the Bland Drain headfirst.
    Don’t complain if your media is pirated when you’re using templates to make it with, and market it to target-groups in the first place.

    And more importantly – what about all the great things being done in folding@home and related sharing networks, distributed clients, etc – all those free and accessible educational and research tools use the same kinds of distributed clients and often the same kinds of file-sharing.
    It’d seem maybe whoever the govts tech advisors are have a vested interest in preventing free computing power access and bandwidth sharing – and they’re using the piracy approach as a scare tactic to get the fake-moral-crusaders on their side;

    same old methods they always use to ban all kinds of other things:

    MARIHUANA: THE ASSASSIN OF YOUTH! = Ban hemp so our chemical patents to turn tree-pulp into paper are used instead of the non-tree non-toxic paper currently in use; ban hemp so biodiesel is forgotten and our petroleum fuel companies take over the market’ ban hemp cause it makes fine textiles and as a crop doesn’t require our patented chemical fertilisers.

    I think we all saw the actual contents of that packet, as it passed by with it’s fake header labelled ‘caring about the children’.

  3. Captain Phishy says

    February 20, 2008 at 10:01 pm

    Ar, these plans could be the berth of me. Shall ‘ave to cut me parrots loose.

  4. eM3rC says

    February 21, 2008 at 3:15 am

    I personally think that implementing a plan like this would cause more problems than solving the pirating solution. Take the average household. The parents only know enough about computers so they can process word documents, check their e-mail and surf the web. Little 14 year old Chris happens to know a *little* more about computers than his parents and decides to download some music/movies off of limewire/bittorrent, etc. The company flags the downloads and shuts down the internet. What will the parents do now? Thanks to their oblivious son who does not know anything about law, has just cut them off from work/doing their work. Should the parents be punished for their children’s actions even though they were unaware downloading movies online was possible?

    Also what about someone mooching off the wireless internet of their neighbor? What happens when the neighbor gets the ban even though they were unknowingly “downloading” illegal content?

    The thing about movies now-a-days is they all seem to be the same. There is always a good guy, a bad guy, and sex. Other than that the methods of using these themes seems fairly similar (treasure, money, etc). I will admit that there have been some very original movies released recently, but overall, cinema has been declining in quality (less story, more special effects).

    @zupacomputer
    Really liked the marijuana part of your post. Great example.

    Gotta save my 100th post for something special :)

    -I think the addition part of posting does not accept the first answer because it has some kind of timer. I.E. after a certain amount of time has passed the answer is no longer valid.-

  5. goodpeople says

    February 21, 2008 at 12:18 pm

    I declare those Brits officially nuts. This cannot be implemented without hurting legitimate traffic.

  6. Pantagruel says

    February 21, 2008 at 10:33 pm

    @eM3rC

    You’re quite right, very few parents understand (or even know) what their kids are up to regarding the internet. They endulge in, amongst otherthings, cyberbashing and are by far leeching more then we where ver exchanging through dat tapes or cd’s (damn I feel oldskool). This behaviour will ultimately lead to them being cut-off (and phoning why their internet’s down).

    @zupacomputer, you must have been smoking pot ;) , there are plenty of otherthings to substitute hemp and get the same bureaucrat ‘rants’ about them knowing what’s good for us.

    The UK is rapily turning into RIAA/MPAA country, I sure hope I will not get arrested at the end of this month just because I used my PDA at a conference and scoured the net.

  7. Captain Phishy says

    February 21, 2008 at 11:25 pm

    I’ve been a hashish/weed smoker every day solid for over 10 years, hardly missed an evening. I don’t smoke during the day though – I have done in my younger days, and that was great too. But I wouldn’t recommend it during say – classtimes, responsible jobs, monitoring heavy web traffic for security breaches.

    I’d recommend it wholeheartedly for vastly improving awful movies, and enduring the other varied onslaughts against sanity that todays world finds an increasing number of ways to unleash.

    re: the bot verifier – I find sometimes it times out, othertimes no.

  8. zupakomputer says

    February 21, 2008 at 11:32 pm

    In the interests of full-disclosure, that was me that posted there. I meant to remove the Captain Phishy joke-handle from my post.

  9. eM3rC says

    February 22, 2008 at 2:40 am

    @zupacomputer
    That was pretty great. Believed the posts were coming from some random troll until you said something about it.

    I wonder what kind of effects smoking pot for 10 years straight would have on a person aside from the possibility of oral cancer.

    @Pantagruel
    I think the odds of them finding anything on you would be one in a million. Unless you have been hacking banks for the last couple of months, I would say there shouldn’t be much for you to worry about.

    I wonder how many connections would be terminated because of people wirelessly mooching and kids downloading illegal content off their parent’s internet.

  10. zupakomputer says

    February 22, 2008 at 4:19 pm

    Effects: none, it wears off after a few hours maximum hence has to be ingested again.

    Oddly, and I know not why this is exactly, since I started smoking I got physically fitter and began understanding the kinds of science topics I previously couldn’t get my head around when I was more an arts major. I think that’s probably more to do with not eating rubbish, though it takes psychedelics to care about what the world is made of and why it exists – and to know you can find out.

    Interestingly, the human brain contains receptors for THC, which seems to occur uniquely in cannabis.

    re: the censors! – the UK was worse than the MPAA for many years, as there was nothing like an Unrated or NC17 certificate here (actually there still isn’t); if a movie was cut, and many were (are still), then that was it – the only way you could see the full version was to import videos from other countries, which also meant having an NTSC VCR – rare in those days, very rare.
    Before this new-fangled interweb, I used to swap and so forth movies such as Exorcist, Texas Chainsaw, Clockwork Orange – they were all unavailable here! TCM was even banned in all cinemas except for in London as the GLC gave it a cert. However as of now – it’s been on TV loads of times for free.

    As yet another (slight) departure from the precise topic at hand – how about the blu-ray news; not good news in terms of getting rid of the region-encoding nonsense, as HD was the region-free format.
    Having region-encoded discs is another good excuse to excuse piracy of films!

  11. eM3rC says

    February 23, 2008 at 4:45 am

    Interestingly enough, I was talking to an epidemiologist the other day and he was telling me about pot. According to him, the chemical in marijuana have to build up in your system before they actually start causing the effects most people experience when they smoke the drug. IE the first couple times are a placebo =P

    Second drug comment. I personally thing marijuana is a far better drug than alcohol. Take driving for example, drunk drivers have the frontal lobe of their brain impaired (controls judgment) so they drive fast and carelessly. High people on the other hand drive amazingly slow and cautiously. What would you rather have, life threatening drunks or annoying but safe pot heads?

    Back to the censoring…
    That really sucks about the censoring. Although those movies are kinda demented they are classics. Now that you bring those topics up, I really do feel the pain of some piraters. I’ll say that there are always the bad and the good ones. The bad ones downloading stuff just for the hell of it and to piss people off. The good ones, watching classics and other movies worth watching… Not all these shit movies being released these days. Good luck with your epic film watching. If you haven’t seem them already I would recommend Momento as something you should see. Very strange but cool way of doing a movie.

    Back to Blu Ray and HD. Toshiba dropped Blu Ray (not sure which format) so it looks like HD (check format) is taking the serious lead now, here in the US.

  12. zupakomputer says

    February 23, 2008 at 1:53 pm

    That’s certainly true about driving. Pot has this effect where you’re seeing more frames per second, wheras drink has this effect where you’re skipping frames.

    I like a drink, but I dislike the way most other people seem to get on drink – loud, uncaring, sloppy, insensitive. Put it this way: I’d never want to live near a pub or a nightclub or bar, but I wouldn’t mind living near a coffeeshop where no drink was served, because you’d never know anyone was there (plus obviously it’d be nearby to drop into).

    I think it’s illegal because it encourages people to take a step back and consider things, and because it keeps things un-violent and mellow.

    Films: I have seen Momento, but quite a while back. The narrative was different from most films, yes. I like that kind of thing. I found Cypher was kinda similar, and Paycheck (way more Hollywood action-oriented), but they were more linear in how the story unfolded. I’m not so into horrors as I used to be – but I do appreciate the damn good ones. It’s an area with even more cliches than many other genres these days.

    Two I’d recommend: Experiments in Terror (shorts collection) and Kairo (the original of remake Pulse).

    I’m more into anything ‘avant garde’ and ‘cyberpunk’ these days when it comes to film, and Mystery Science Theatre 3000!

  13. eM3rC says

    February 23, 2008 at 6:08 pm

    I know what you mean about drink. It seems there are always those people who are amazing to be around when there drunk, mellow, calm, and funny. While there are those who go “ape shit” as soon as they get drunk. Aside from all the drinkers coming out of the bars at like 3am in the morning I think there might also be some problems with prostitution and drug dealers selling drugs laced with some not-so-nice things. A coffee shop or some upbeat cafe would be nice cause of good quality snacks/drinks as well as the people that attend. Drunks or caffeine high people…. hrmmm…..

    The government does that a lot. Take the war in Iraq for example. Although I am in full support of the troops over there right now, I would really like to know how the hell Bush was elected over Gore. Lets compare, Bush cannot make a complete sentence with the help of his speech writers… The other candidate won an Emmy… The government doesn’t like its people to think, it likes them to obey.

    I have not seem Cypher yet but will add that to my list. Paycheck I did see though and though that movie (story wise of course) was pretty good. I never was a real horror fan but 28 Days Later is my favorite zombie movie (Shaun of the Dead for comedy horror) and Cloverfield for just overall monster movie.

    I have not heard of either of those movies so I’ll have to add those to my list also. Thanks for the recommendations!

    Mystery Science Theatre 3000 is amazing. No matter what I hope those movies will never die off.

    More or less back to the topic… What is your favorite hacker movie? I would vote for either Hacker 2 (the one about Kevin Mitnick) or possibly Enemy of the State (less hacker oriented but very cool story).

  14. Pantagruel says

    February 24, 2008 at 3:57 pm

    @eM3rC

    Wargames, it was run yesterday in the NL, very very old ;)
    There are plenty ‘hacker’ inspired movies (Hackers,Hackers 2 – take down) or movies sporting hacking acts (The Matrix, Johnny Mnemonic) but I guess there is no real blockbuster in a serious hacking movie.

    It’s not fair comparing a redneck like Bush to an academic scholar like Gore. I have seen Gore’s movie and have my doubts about some points he makes. I pity the American Soldiers down there who went to safeguard the oil reserves with the idea of fighting ‘terrorists. The so called smoking gun was nothing more than a freshly lit cigar and quite a few allies followed the Americans and British without much thought.
    It quite absurd that people have to die just to safeguard ‘ a way of live’.

  15. Darknet says

    February 24, 2008 at 4:29 pm

    I guess I can do a list of Hacking movies for you guys some day.

  16. Bogwitch says

    February 24, 2008 at 11:04 pm

    Darknet, I would prefer if you could name one GOOD hacking film! :)

    @zupakomputer et al. Sorry to say but stoned is impaired. I would not compare it to the level of intoxication you can experience under alcohol but pot can seriously affect your perception.

  17. Darknet says

    February 25, 2008 at 1:07 am

    What about Sneakers? Or Freedom Downtime?

  18. eM3rC says

    February 25, 2008 at 4:27 am

    Wargames was another good classic. Die Hard 4 (hacking of course) was amazingly good considering Bruce Willis is around 60 and it was the forth movie of a series. There are very few movies where the second one is better or even on par with the first. Matrix I also liked because of the way it challenged reality. Imagine of hacking eventually was plugging oneself into a computer and fully integrating yourself with the system. That would be awesome :)

    I think its fair game to compare the two because they both ran for president. Although some points might be exaggerated you have to remember the general public lives off propaganda. Whether its commercials, shows or the news. I think that “safeguard of life” is life as it is. IE, SUVs, overly large homes, and general wasteful things with the all American nuclear family. I wish people will rely more on negotiation rather than fighting as a first action…

    @Darknet
    That would be cool although the list would be amazingly long considering almost all spy, terrorist, action movies always have that one guy who is really good at hacking. Why not do like a top 10 hacking movies list and have the posters vote for their top 10?

    @Bogwich
    I would rather be around a person stoned out of their mind than a person drunk out of their mind.

  19. Bogwitch says

    February 25, 2008 at 7:00 am

    @Darknet – Sneakers? Really? Not really my taste… Freedom Downtime is one that has excaped me – I’ll see if I can get hold of it.

    @eM3rC – Absolutely. Although I’d rather neither were driving.

  20. zupakomputer says

    February 25, 2008 at 6:25 pm

    I liked Hackers, and agreed that Die Hard 4 was amazingly good, best film I’d rented for a looong time. The Matirx yeah also, although I felt it went the wrong way early on – most movies wait til around the last 10 minutes when they are good films, before going into ‘seen it!’ mode.

    Still like it though – the Animatirx is great too!

    Sneakers, yup, that was cool. I don’t think I’ve seen Hackers 2. Wargames was one of those films I saw and thought, “I knew it, you can change information elsewhere with a computer!”

    As to stoned being impaired…..not sure if you mean while driving, or in general. It depends – it doesn’t impair you when driving, but as I said it isn’t something you’d take if you were in class, or trying to learn or do fast work. There’s meds for that too, but I tend to just take nothing there or have a coffee.

    I don’t know how to take how wrong everything started to go; the thing is – the US elections were a shambles for about two months before any decision was even made as to who won. I recall looking at the news one day and being surprised it still hadn’t been called.
    I’d have probably voted for Nader, since my sensibilities are completely green – which is another aspect of the shambles; both candidates are Skull and Bonesmen – yet to look at the true history of paganism, masons, templars, and so forth – it’s all about Earth worship. So I look at it more that a) I considered politics a big sham way before 2000 anyway, and b) the worlds full of fake bodies of control that claims to be associated with things they just aren’t a part of.

    9-11 just plummeted things even further down the drain, in terms of all that came about because of it at the least. I was just thinking earlier on, how much things suck just cause you can’t even have a smoke (of a cig! not even about joints here) anymore in a cafe; it was bad enough when They banned that from the cinemas, the zombie freaks that They are. I really think what happened because of 9-11 just made those sorts of even-worse laws have a chance of being enforced.

    Another evil-of-evils, was when They banned magic mushrooms in the UK. Also after 9-11 and yet more needless proponenting of the ill-fated war economy.
    I honestly think only a alien invasion or machines becoming sentient, ironically, has a chance of saving this world. Either that, or I’m moving to the East so’s I can eat my veggie dimsum, and have a smoke at the same time, in some Blade Runner type of world. But I’ll live in the outer green parts, and commute.

    As part of some of the cool stuff that does exist however – saw a news story yesterday that an Australian/US company is releasing a game controller this year – that lets you control the gameplay with your mind. I’m looking forward to trying that out. No doubt the brain machine folks will pick up on them for biofeedback units, and telepathic enhancements (because, I presume, your thought waves must have to be pretty accurate for the device to know what you intend).

  21. zupakomputer says

    February 25, 2008 at 6:39 pm

    Has anyone seen the German film 23 (about a hacker, meant to be based on a true story)? It got like one cinema showing here I think; I was trying to get a subbed copy for a while back and no-one seemed to have it.

    re: Enemy of the State – wasn’t that more about survelliance? Ghost in the Shell (and it’s sequel) have a fair bit of reality-virtualreality mixings in them. There’s some anime I’ve yet to see like .hack//sign and Megazone23 that are about getting stuck in virtual worlds.

    A lot of way cool video games about hacking computers and being within a computer – Bioshock has that element, and shooter games like Rez, and the Rayforce &/ Raycrisis series.
    Definitely check out the cyberpunkreview website for hacking-related films, and approach all Polybius cabs with caution!

  22. Pantagruel says

    February 25, 2008 at 7:43 pm

    @zupakomputer

    You mean: 23, Nichts ist so wie es schein. It’s kinda hard to get a copy. Next time I’m in Germany I’ll scour about.
    Hint: do a torrent search

    sorry all .otr’s seem to be be bust :(

  23. Bogwitch says

    February 25, 2008 at 9:05 pm

    @zupakomputer – I have to disagree with you, driving while high on pot is dangerous. Certainly no where near as dangerous as driving while drunk, but your concentration can be way off when stoned. I’ll admit I’ve driven while stoned and often there would be no noticable difference to my driving on other occasions it was clear that my concentration could have been better. That said, driving while chronically fatigued is worse.
    I wasn’t aware that the US was playing the ‘blame smokers for everything’ game, too. I do want to quit the ciggies but I’ll be damned if I’m going to be told by a bunch of politicians that I must! There has even been discussion about charging smokers a license fee to buy cigarettes in the UK!

  24. zupakomputer says

    February 26, 2008 at 1:28 pm

    Disagree if you want; I know it’s not dangerous. It’s actually more dangerous to drive on caffeine & a whole load of perscription drugs than it is stoned.
    I tried one anti-depressant once, it had no indication at all on the packet or the inner notes not to drive etc while on it – it munged me out moreso, and impaired me more, than any drink or drug had ever done.
    And it was meant to be three a day, every day, for people to normally intermingle in society – I couldn’t even form a thought on one pill.

    That said, there’s plenty of people that drive drunk and they never have any problems either. It’s not about what you’re on, it’s the type of intelligence you have and the kind of mindset you have, and although drugs (inc drink) do have specific effects, they don’t affect everyone exactly the same.
    It does depend on loads of other things – the company you keep, what you’ve eaten, is the road on a dodgy ley line, etc.

    Did you ever see the documentary about the commercial airline pilots that always flew totally blotto? They never had any problems doing so; they did get caught – but it wasn’t because they were impaired, it was because they got spied on.

    They should do a study about driving on heroin -a real study, not those fake ones where they pick total idiots that can’t function sober and don’t have a clue about anything. That’d shut all kinds of people up about dangerous drugs. It’s a painkiller whackjobs, what do you think it does.

    re: the HD and bluray formats – according to the news stories HD is definitely not being made anymore. Off the bat I don’t recall if bluray has any region 0 recording facility; HD was region-free by default.

  25. zupakomputer says

    February 26, 2008 at 2:19 pm

    re: Cloverfield !

    Definitely one to see then? I’m right into the likes of Godzilla, giant robot, Cthulhu movies.

  26. zupakomputer says

    February 26, 2008 at 3:02 pm

    re: nootropics, nootropins.

    Noticed some of the ubercool overclocking and modding sites are picking up a lot more on brain food products; so I had yet another look around online for that ‘leet haxor’ old time long-known favourite, the area of smart drugs.

    And guess what! Over a decade later and the UK is still no closer to legally allowing people to buy drugs that make them cleverer and let them live healthier and longer. It’s impossible to find anyplace that sells liquid hydergine that doesn’t also state that they ‘don’t ship to the UK’. Ho-hum.

    I’d first read about these so long ago, in magazines like MONDO2000 and Psychedelic Illuminations. Years back I did manage to find some places that sold to the UK, but as I say, it’s very telling that the situation hasn’t improved at all. Not a smart bar in sight! They’ve only begun to catch on to the organic juice bar & raw food concept of eateries. Someone open a goatrance club with a smart bar already!

  27. Bogwitch says

    February 26, 2008 at 5:28 pm

    @zupakomputer
    Hey, I can only go on my own experience, YMMV. Caffeine has zero effect on me, save the diuretic effect. As I said, stoned I often had no effects but occasionally I allowed my concentration to fade and once I had a fit of the giggles that made me pull over!
    A quick question – are you based in the US or the UK?

    Re: smart drugs. I’ve not had any experience of these. Surely if they had been proven to work (scientifically proven) there would be pressure groups/ lobbyists from the large pharmaceuticals pushing HARD to get a license?

    And don’t get me started about raw food, specifically vegetables. One of my soapboxes! (I’m pro, BTW)

  28. eM3rC says

    February 26, 2008 at 11:44 pm

    Damn zupakomputer! Talk about a lot of insightful posts!

    Ok, I’m going to try and comment on a lot of what you said so please for give the out of orderness of my post.

    Drugs – for drivers I would have to say a drugless one is probably the best one although a high one would be better than a drunk one. I also agree with the fact that a lot of the drug tests are very very biased. Like a lot of tests performed by the government they are rigged so the predicted outcome will happen. Drug wise they could use the people who are already heavy addicts for a lot of different things and have managed to already destroy their brains.

    I think the effects of some drugs are overemphasized. Taking pot, as the subject drug, I would say it is illegal in many places because of the side effects of “hallucinations” (I know there’s a better word but can’t think of it right now) and such. Smoking on the other hand is just like a caffeine high.

    Movies – I have to agree on all the movies with you although I have never heard of 23 or watched an episode of .hack//sign. Enemy of the State was more of a government conspiracy movie with an old guy that happened to be good at computers. Cloverfield was an amazing movie (if you look at it style wise) although it in no way involved hacking.

    HD is dead. Blu Ray is guess is the next gen DVD type.

    I know im forgetting some of the stuff you mentioned but I need to go to leave for work in 5 minutes so I’ll conclude by saying drugs are ok as long as other people don’t suffer because of them, government does a lot of stupid stuff, many many good movies out there (there should be a hacking movie list on this site), and there is always a way to get drugs into the country. If you have any foreign friends having them order the product, then hide it in something and ship it over would seem to work. Anywho loved your posts zupakomputer and will finish replying later.

  29. Nobody_Holme says

    February 27, 2008 at 11:07 am

    *facepalm* wheres my MP’s “complain at parliament for you” page gone? Thank god he really does. *yays for good MPs*

  30. zupakomputer says

    February 27, 2008 at 5:53 pm

    Funny! I’m terrible when it comes to the diuretic effects of alcohol, but with coffee that doesn’t affect me much.

    The smartdrugs – you’d think they would get lobbying from the pharm companies, but think about it further – nah, they don’t want people to get well, they want people to be addicted to their drugs. So prescribing things that actually prevent and reverse the likes of Alzheimers isn’t on their agendas at all.
    Saying that, many pharm companies do make them – but for whatever reason they aren’t entirely owned by one company or another, in many cases, so the same drugs can be bought
    (in the USA it’s legal to buy them with a doctors note, 3 month supply at a time – many folks get them mail order from nearby countries, or just go for a border hop to buy them.
    I had a similar experience at chemists in India – you can buy prescription drugs really cheap there, OTC.)
    under many different brand names.

    And the pharm companies do have problems getting drugs cleared for safety in the first place, there’s horrendously long time-periods slapped on them for approvals – yet many drugs that pass and go on the market are just so bad for anyone to ingest,
    it’s very common for someone with an illness to end up on more than one type of prescription drug, permanently, and the drugs are given to them to offset the side-effects of other drugs – an approach that will just make them sicker.

    And of course – if the food wasn’t grown non-organically to begin with, then people would be very less likely to get ill.

    Plus the reason for so many abusive animal tests is purely because of the ways drug comapnies are expected to prove a drug is safe.
    It’d help if more herbal and natural drugs were used in the first place; they’ve been known to work for hundreds of years and more.

    I’m UK based; send donations to the Zupakomputer Fund for the Holisitcally Challenged Victims of Totalitarianism and help people that think they live in first world countries realise that they don’t.

  31. tekse7en says

    March 2, 2008 at 6:42 am

    Jesus H. Christ… talk about comments getting way off topic… lol. But on the topic of awesome hacking movies, maybe darknet should hold a collective hacking-screenplay-writing thing where a bunch of people could pitch in on a bitchin hacking-based movie? At least we could make sure it would realistic.

  32. Pantagruel says

    March 2, 2008 at 8:57 am

    @tekse7en

    lol, guess zupakomputer would pitch in big amounts of brain stimulation substances.

  33. zupakomputer says

    March 2, 2008 at 3:31 pm

    It’s not really off-topic at all, the topic’s on piracy. Anything that gets outlawed and either shouldn’t be, or is in someway otherwise unavailble (like decent films, which is where the tangenital commentry sprung from) – it’s going to be pirated (copied, smuggled, etc).

    What about a better version of Matrix Reloaded with more of the Carcassonne part* – pirate Templars, ar!
    ‘oist thee jolly roger

    *in case anyone missed it, I’m meaning The Frenchman’s castle – it’s clearly a reference to the Cathars and the Visigoths and all that Rennes les Chateau stuff.

    Well I always thought so anyway.

  34. zupakomputer says

    March 2, 2008 at 3:37 pm

    Anyone for cake – that evil East European temporal-dilating drug?

    Jammy dodger? Savoy Truffle? Jam on it’s own? Pie-fight in the war room?

  35. Pantagruel says

    March 3, 2008 at 9:57 pm

    @zupa, you mean space cake, erhhmm jummy 2 slices

  36. zupakomputer says

    March 4, 2008 at 2:02 pm

    ‘Cake’ – the faux drug with time-dilation properties, is from an episode of Brass Eye. I was refering to that, mixed in with a reference to the cake in the same part of that Matrix movie mentioned.
    And then other cake refs.; all probably a bit obscure.

    “Shmoke and a pancake? […..] Bong and a biscuit?”

  37. zupakomputer says

    March 4, 2008 at 6:07 pm

    re: hack-ish films. Anyone see Untraceable yet? Is there much networking stuff in it?, or is it more like fear.com or My Little Eye or Devour, one of those horror / dodgy-website movies.

  38. Pantagruel says

    March 5, 2008 at 11:51 am

    @Zupakomputer

    Scoured up Untraceable, it’s a well thought out movie (reminds me of CSI:Las Vegas – Grave danger)

  39. zupakomputer says

    March 7, 2008 at 8:03 pm

    Well it looks like prickwad’s been spying on what I’ve been typing again:

    http://www.dosenation.com/listing.php?smlid=3856

    Why don’t you go back to see the wizard G, and ask him for a pair of balls as well this time, so you don’t keep on doing what the enemy programs you to do and say.

  40. Pantagruel says

    March 8, 2008 at 12:22 pm

    nice link zupakomputer, clearly points out the US ‘view’ on diverse ‘enhancing’ substances

  41. Pantagruel says

    March 31, 2008 at 6:50 pm

    Virgin media (ISP) will be cracking down on illegal content downloaders

    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2008/03/30/cnvirgin130.xml

    but at the same time will offer it’s users a new usenet service which suposedly will be intraceable.

    torrentfreak.com/isp-to-voluntarily-disconnect-file-sharers-from-the-internet-080331/

    Perhaps Mr. Branson has cooked up a new way to distribute his music via this channel ?? or might they be merely generating the evidence they need to get some conficted for copyright infringements?

  42. zupakomputer says

    April 1, 2008 at 1:12 pm

    From the first link:

    “The BPI has teams of technicians to trace illegal music downloading to individual accounts. It will hand these account numbers over to Virgin Media, which will match them to names and addresses.”

    How are they allowed to legally trace any internet traffic down to an account number or IP? Since when is the BPI the police, and have a search warrant that allows them to trace or search communications traffic?

    Put it this way: if they suspected someone recieved a copied file in the postal system, would they be allowed to intercept mail, and open it up to see what was in it? Of course not. The internet isn’t any different, it’s electronic communication rather than postal based.

    You aren’t even allowed to use recordings of telephone conversations IN COURT, INCLUDING IF YOU’RE THE POLICE, unless you had prior approval to be specifically allowed to intercept and trace the call.

    If I was an ISP owner, I’m not saying I wouldn’t listen to complaints about a user, and I’d still look at any evidence presented even if it wasn’t legally gathered, as is the case with all this copyright-related spying, BUT – I’d need more than just say a log file and trace details on it: those can be faked, especially if you don’t actually see them running yourself in realtime. I’d need to hear the backstory – how did you come to locate this person doing whatever it is online? What about them or their traffic made you think they were doing whatever it was?

    AND – I’d ask them why they aren’t going to whoever is hosting the sites being downloaded from, and telling them to stop their services.

    If it comes to something even more personal, like intercepting transmissions between individual users (ie – they aren’t downloading from websites or servers, they are sending files to one another directly or by e-mail or some such) then I’d be especially interested to find out how they came to be intercepting people’s private communications with one another.
    That isn’t hit-and-miss; how many users communications have they illegally spied on, in order to read messages saying something like ‘here’s that cd I copied for you’????

    There’s a BIG DIFFERENCE between making someone a copy of a tape or a CD or some such, and pirating loads of material and selling it.

    The fact that they aren’t going directly to any providers of the material individuals are accessing proves to me that they are spineless and can’t be trusted.
    They’re just like those twats that spend million$ on adverts about paying TV licences and tax discs, and it costs them more to put on the ads and crush perfectly working vehicles than they’d recover in taxes.

    I’m not even interested in downloading copied films and music; I just know what this is really about. The sooner other countries start offering ISP access to different countries, the better.
    The internet is meant to compensate for some of what’s wrong with offline human society: namely things like borders between countries, taxes on top of goods bought and sold, lack of anonymity, and difficult and costly information access.

    Someone should hack all these spying bastards offline.

  43. zupakomputer says

    April 1, 2008 at 2:12 pm

    A possible heads-up; I think that second link to the torrent news site is a bit dodgy; my browser starter running extremely slow there, then it wouldn’t let me reload it and claimed some default profile was still being used (not an alert I’ve ever seen this browser do in years of use).

    However, I’d earlier been at a site I also had never visted before, so it’s possible that one was to blame.

  44. Darknet says

    April 1, 2008 at 3:41 pm

    No probs here with the second link, TF is a legit site.

  45. Pantagruel says

    April 1, 2008 at 7:11 pm

    @zupakomputer

    Indeed it’s rather strange that a non-govermental body like the BPI will provide such data to Virgin, seems rather illegal.

    It seems the ISP’s are stuck between a rock and a hard place. On one side they have costumers to service and protect what their costumers behaviour. On the otherside their are non-govermental organisation urging them to surrender details regarding supposed copyright infringement. Real governmental organisation are forcing them to shed light on internet traffic regarding things like copyright infringments, childporn and possible terrorist behaviour.

    The thought of an ISP producing log/trace data to suit the needs of a govermental body is rather sickening, it might be naive but I hope they will resist such temptations.

    Getting the distributing side to stop can be rather difficult. Russia (Poetin) for instance has not signed the European Cybercrime Convention so they will be reluctant to do your bidding.

    It’s quite funny how, for instance the MPAA or RIAA, has made it their business to pursue the ‘small; fish in the tank instead of going for the proffesional pirates. Guess they just want to show that the average jane/Joe isn’t save from them.

    I personally think that downloading actually has enhanced some artists reputations and sales. The bad thing is the music industry is a bottomless pit always wanting more and specialising in one hit wonders instead of solid artists. All the ‘find a new idol in whatever field’ programms are a tribute to this one hit wonder thinking.

  46. zupakomputer says

    April 2, 2008 at 3:56 pm

    Not only that, I tried looking up Napster’s search recently for two tracks I’m after – one they don’t have, and it’s been deleted for ages off any official releases, the other came up ‘we have track by that artist’ – then provided no links, and no further means of seeing if they had that track or just the artists other tracks, no info on prices or anything either.

    So what are you meant to do in those circumstances; you don’t pay in advance to join something, in the event they *may* have what you want…

    and what if no-one sells what you want? I’d imagine that if I bothered to list all the tracks I’ve wanted for aeons and never got, cause I’d have to buy a whole album for one song, few of them would appear for legit online downloads.

    The usenet service looks promising, although ftp binaries obviously can be downloaded / uploaded already anyway – unless it’s encrypted though, the traffic can still be intercepted and read.

  47. Pantagruel says

    April 2, 2008 at 4:08 pm

    @zupakomputer

    Your right, Napster and alikes might be suitable for the average user not in search for particular artists/tracks.

    True, I personally think they should let you have a peek at their content (without download or let’s say 30 sec’s of 10 songs) before you actually join them and pay for their services. Paying just to find out that do not have what you’re looking for is a nice business model but ultimately sucks.

    In the end you’ll indeed have to resolve to buying the album containing the one song you want and get the others as unwelcome ‘gift’. (I usually check the left over section for this kind of stuff, but you still feel rather silly that an album would have set you back

  48. zupakomputer says

    April 2, 2008 at 4:20 pm

    Or what about this one? – I’ve bought a lot of legit goa/psytrance CDs, and found a site that provided the same type I’m into for free. None of them have releases except as whole albums on torrent. Now, I’m unable to use torrent and have no indication of when that’ll change. I’m also not too sure I’m okay with using that kind of a share anyway – anyone could be sending anything down it the other way.

    But these clowns claim to be ‘elite’, yet they can only provide one file format (and no bitrate info (ie – the quality of the file they offer off the original MIDI or similar) either I don’t think)! Even if you upload to the archive, for free, they will do all the work for you – sort out all your album tracks* into separate track downloads under every file format you can think of.

    I offered to cover costs for them to burn me CDs, and they couldn’t do that either.

    Just because it’s ‘free’ doesn’t mean it’s not as bad as the BPI spying or some other aspect of the controlled-phoney areas of music.

    *ie – your own made-by-you music / audio; I doubt they allow anything pirated there

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Credential stuffing attack in 2025 — automated login form attack showing combolist attempts, hit rate and stolen credentials

Credential Stuffing in 2025 – How Combolists, Infostealers and Account Takeover Became an Industry

Views: 303

Stolen credentials are now the single most reliable entry point into enterprise networks. Compromised credentials accounted for 22% of all confirmed data breaches in the period covered by Verizon’s extended credential stuffing analysis accompanying the 2025 DBIR, making it the most common initial access vector for the third consecutive year. Credential stuffing, the automated replay of stolen username-password pairs at scale, requires minimal skill, costs almost nothing to run, and succeeds at rates that make it economically rational to run campaigns against thousands of targets simultaneously. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) remains the single most effective control against it, yet deployment gaps persist across sectors that should know better.

Credential Stuffing in 2025 - How Combolists, Infostealers and Account Takeover Became an Industry

The Credential Supply Chain

Credential stuffing depends on a supply chain that runs from infostealer malware through dark web markets to attack tooling. Malware families, including Lumma, RedLine, StealC, and Acreed, scrape browser password vaults, saved cookies, and autofill data from compromised machines. The harvested data is identical to what tools like DumpBrowserSecrets extract during post-exploitation: saved passwords, session cookies, OAuth refresh tokens, and autofill entries pulled directly from Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and every other major browser. Attackers package that raw material into structured files known as combolists, formatted as email: password pairs, cleaned of duplicates, and categorised by service type or geography before selling them on.

Combolists trade freely across dark web forums, Telegram channels, and dedicated cracking communities. The initial access broker ecosystem documented throughout 2025 has normalised validated credentials as a commodity. Fresh lists built from recent infostealer logs command significantly higher prices than aged database dumps because they have higher validity rates. The Verizon analysis found that only 49% of a user’s passwords across different services are distinct. That figure is what makes credential stuffing economically viable: breach one service, and there is roughly a 50% chance the same password works elsewhere. Across millions of accounts, that probability becomes near-certainty.

The tooling that drives attacks is openly available. OpenBullet and its successor, SilverBullet, are credential-stuffing frameworks originally released as penetration testing utilities, now standard tools in account-takeover (ATO) operations. They automate the full attack loop: loading combolists, rotating through residential proxies to dodge rate limiting and IP blocks, sending login requests that mimic legitimate browser behaviour, and logging successful hits. Attackers also buy and sell custom configuration files, known as configs, that define the authentication flow for specific target services. Unofficial marketplaces offer configs for specific banking portals, SaaS platforms, and enterprise single sign-on (SSO) providers alongside combolists and proxy subscriptions.

Three Case Studies from 2025

In late March 2025, coordinated credential stuffing attacks hit five major Australian superannuation funds simultaneously: AustralianSuper, Rest Super, Hostplus, Australian Retirement Trust, and Insignia Financial. As BleepingComputer reported on the coordinated attacks, attackers compromised over 20,000 accounts across the five funds, with four AustralianSuper members losing a combined AUD 500,000. The attackers used combolists from prior unrelated breaches. AustralianSuper offered MFA but did not enforce it at login, a gap that regulators identified as the primary enabling factor. Retirement funds make attractive targets because account balances are high, withdrawals are slow to reverse, and many members check their accounts infrequently.

In April 2025, VF Corporation notified customers of a credential-stuffing attack against the North Face online store. BleepingComputer’s coverage of the April incident confirmed that attackers used credentials from earlier unrelated breaches to access accounts and exfiltrate names, email addresses, shipping addresses, phone numbers, purchase history, and dates of birth. Payment card data was not exposed, as a third-party provider handles payment processing. The April attack followed a March incident that exposed 15,700 accounts across The North Face and Timberland. It was the fourth credential stuffing incident against VF Corporation brands since 2020. The pattern reflects a structural problem: tens of millions of customer accounts, high password reuse rates, and authentication systems not designed to detect low-and-slow validation campaigns.

The Change Healthcare breach in February 2024 remains the most consequential recent example of credential-based initial access. The ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group entered UnitedHealth’s Change Healthcare subsidiary through compromised Citrix credentials on a remote-access portal without MFA, as confirmed in Congressional testimony from UnitedHealth’s CEO. The attackers moved laterally through the billing network and deployed ransomware that shut down payment processing for healthcare providers across the United States for weeks. The incident produced a $22 million ransom payment and an estimated $872 million in reported disruption costs in the first quarter alone. One set of valid credentials on one unprotected endpoint caused one of the largest healthcare-sector disruptions in US history.

Detection and Evasion Techniques

Modern credential stuffing campaigns specifically target the detection mechanisms most organisations have deployed. Attackers bypass velocity-based controls that flag high volumes of failed login attempts from a single IP by rotating through residential proxies. They distribute attempts across thousands of IP addresses so each one generates only a handful of requests, staying below alert thresholds. Third-party CAPTCHA-solving services handle challenge pages, some of which are automated via machine learning and others through human labour farms. Tools that emulate legitimate browser environments, including correct JavaScript execution, realistic mouse movement patterns, and authentic request timing, defeat browser fingerprinting.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework categorises credential stuffing under T1110.004 (Brute Force: Credential Stuffing). Defenders should monitor for several specific signals: unusual geographic distributions of authentication requests, spikes in failed logins spread across a wide IP range rather than concentrated at a single source, and successful logins from IP addresses tied to residential proxy services. Account logins from devices or browsers with no prior history on the account also warrant investigation. The Verizon analysis found that credential stuffing accounted for a median of 19% of all authentication attempts across SSO providers, meaning roughly one in five login attempts was not legitimate.

One underappreciated detection gap is the window between credential exposure and organisational awareness. Dark web monitoring tools available to enterprise teams in 2025 make it operationally achievable to track stealer log markets and paste sites for corporate email domains. Many organisations still treat that monitoring as optional rather than a core detection layer. Credentials circulate in combolists for months before the affected organisation becomes aware, and attackers exploit that window systematically.

Regulatory Response

The 23andMe case produced the most visible regulatory outcome tied directly to credential stuffing. A 2023 attack using combolists accessed approximately 6.9 million customer records. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office fined the company £2.31 million for failing to implement adequate security, specifically the absence of mandatory MFA for accounts holding sensitive genetic data. In March 2025, as Wired reported in its coverage of the 23andMe bankruptcy, the company filed for Chapter 11, with the credential stuffing incident and its downstream legal consequences cited as contributing factors. Regulators in the UK and EU now reference the case as evidence that weak authentication controls constitute a material governance failure, not a technical oversight.

CISA’s 2024 guidance on phishing-resistant MFA explicitly identifies credential stuffing as a primary threat driver. It recommends hardware security keys and passkeys using the WebAuthn standard as the only controls that fully eliminate the credential reuse vector. SMS one-time passwords and Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) codes provide partial protection but remain vulnerable to adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) interception, a technique increasingly applied against accounts whose value justifies the extra effort.

CISO Playbook

Phishing-resistant MFA enforced across all externally facing authentication endpoints, including VPN portals, SSO providers, and remote desktop services, eliminates the primary path for exploitation. Password screening against known-breach corpora at login and account creation, using services such as the Have I Been Pwned API, removes credentials already circulating in combolists before attackers can validate them. Rate limiting and progressive account lockout on all authentication endpoints, including API login flows that teams frequently overlook, cuts the volume of attempts that reach the validation stage.

Bot detection that analyses behavioural signals, including request timing, device fingerprint consistency, and session cookie behaviour, provides a second line of defence against campaigns that have already bypassed IP-based controls. For organisations on legacy identity infrastructure, a full platform replacement is not the immediate priority. Enforcing MFA on the externally facing authentication layer, regardless of what sits behind it, addresses the highest-risk exposure first. The Change Healthcare incident is the clearest available proof of what one unprotected endpoint costs at scale.

There is no technical solution that eliminates credential stuffing entirely. Password reuse persists, infostealers continue operating at scale, and combolists will keep growing. The practical objective for defenders is to raise the cost of a successful attack on their specific environment above what attackers can profitably tolerate, and to detect the attempts that do succeed before they compound into something worse. Given that 22% of breaches in 2025 started with a valid credential, organisations that treat authentication hygiene as routine maintenance rather than a strategic priority are already in the breach statistics.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is credential stuffing, and how does it differ from brute force?

Credential stuffing uses real username-password pairs stolen from previous breaches and automatically replays them against other services. Brute force generates password guesses from scratch. Stuffing is faster, quieter, and far more effective because it exploits password reuse rather than attempting to crack unknown passwords. A combolist of 10 million verified credentials will outperform any brute-force dictionary attack against the same target.

What is a combolist, and where do attackers get them?

A combolist is a structured file of email-and-password pairs compiled from data breaches, infostealer malware logs, and dark web markets. Attackers source them from initial access broker forums, Telegram channels, and dedicated credential marketplaces. Fresh lists derived from recent infostealer campaigns are the most valuable because their owners have not yet rotated the credentials.

How do attackers bypass rate limiting and CAPTCHA during credential stuffing?

Attackers use residential proxy networks to distribute login attempts across thousands of IP addresses, keeping per-IP request volumes below detection thresholds. CAPTCHA challenges are handled by third-party solving services, either via automated machine-learning methods or by human labour farms. Tools such as OpenBullet and SilverBullet emulate realistic browser behaviour, including JavaScript execution and mouse-movement patterns, to evade browser fingerprinting controls.

Does multi-factor authentication stop credential stuffing?

Phishing-resistant MFA using hardware security keys or passkeys under the WebAuthn standard fully eliminates the credential reuse vector. SMS one-time passwords and TOTP codes reduce exposure but remain vulnerable to adversary-in-the-middle interception. The Change Healthcare breach, which resulted in $872 million in disruption costs, occurred on a Citrix portal with no MFA. Enforcing MFA on every externally facing authentication endpoint is the single highest-impact control available.

What are the most common targets for credential stuffing attacks?

Enterprise SSO portals, VPN gateways, e-commerce account login pages, financial services platforms, and healthcare provider systems are the most frequently targeted. Retirement and superannuation funds have emerged as high-value targets in 2025 because account balances are large, members check accounts infrequently, and MFA enforcement has historically been optional rather than mandatory.

How can organisations detect credential stuffing attacks in progress?

Key signals include spikes in authentication requests distributed across a wide IP range rather than concentrated at a single source, successful logins from residential proxy IP addresses, account access from devices or browsers with no prior history, and unusual geographic distributions in login activity. Continuous monitoring of dark web stealer log markets for corporate email domains provides early warning before credentials are actively exploited. The Verizon 2025 DBIR found that credential stuffing accounts for a median of 19% of all SSO authentication attempts, so baseline volume analysis is also a viable detection layer.

This article covers techniques used by both attackers and defenders for educational and research purposes. The tools and marketplaces described are documented by security researchers and law enforcement agencies.

DumpBrowserSecrets – Browser Credential Harvesting with App-Bound Encryption Bypass

DumpBrowserSecrets – Browser Credential Harvesting with App-Bound Encryption Bypass

Views: 799

DumpBrowserSecrets is a post-exploitation credential-harvesting tool from Maldev Academy that extracts secrets across all major browsers from a single Windows executable. It is the successor to their earlier DumpChromeSecrets project, which is now deprecated, and extends coverage from Chrome alone to the full range of Chromium-based and Gecko-based browsers in common enterprise use.

DumpBrowserSecrets – Browser Credential Harvesting with App-Bound Encryption Bypass

Modern browsers are credential vaults. Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Firefox, Opera, Opera GX, and Vivaldi all store saved passwords, session cookies, OAuth refresh tokens, credit card numbers, autofill data, and full browsing history in local SQLite databases and JSON files on disk. On a compromised Windows host, that data is frequently the fastest path to lateral movement, cloud account takeover, or persistent access to enterprise SaaS platforms without ever touching LSASS.

Where tools like Mimikatz target Windows credential stores such as LSASS and the Security Account Manager (SAM), DumpBrowserSecrets focuses entirely on the browser layer, where credentials are increasingly stored as enterprises adopt SSO, OAuth, and browser-based SaaS workflows. The threat model has shifted: a developer’s browser session today may hold active tokens for GitHub, AWS consoles, Okta, Slack, and internal tooling simultaneously.

How It Works

DumpBrowserSecrets consists of two components that work together: a compiled executable (DumpBrowserSecrets.exe) and a DLL (DllExtractChromiumSecrets.dll).

For Chromium-based browsers using App-Bound Encryption (Chrome, Brave, and Microsoft Edge), the challenge is that Google introduced App-Bound Encryption in Chrome 127, tying cookie and credential encryption keys to the Chrome application identity. The encryption key, stored as app_bound_encrypted_key in the browser’s Local State file, can only be decrypted via Chrome’s elevation service through the IElevator COM (Component Object Model) interface.

DumpBrowserSecrets handles this by spawning a headless Chromium process, then injecting the DLL into it via Early Bird APC (Asynchronous Procedure Call) injection, a technique that queues shellcode execution before the target process’s main thread begins. The DLL runs inside the Chromium process context, uses the IElevator COM interface to decrypt the App-Bound Encryption key, and returns the decrypted key to the executable via a named pipe. The executable then parses the browser’s on-disk SQLite databases and decrypts stored data locally.

For Opera, Opera GX, and Vivaldi, which use DPAPI (Data Protection API) keys rather than App-Bound Encryption, the same injection approach retrieves DPAPI keys instead.

For Firefox, which uses Mozilla’s NSS (Network Security Services) library with AES-256-CBC or 3DES-CBC encryption for logins, the executable handles all extraction and decryption directly with no DLL injection required.

The tool includes several evasion features relevant to operational use: compile-time string obfuscation, API hashing to defeat static analysis, PPID (Parent Process ID), and argument spoofing via NtCreateUserProcess with manual CSRSS registration, handle duplication to bypass file locks held by running browsers, and a custom SQLite3 file format parser (SQLoot, introduced in v1.1.1) that replaces the sqlite-amalgamation dependency to reduce the static footprint.

Extracted Data

The following data types are extracted per browser. Encryption models vary: Chrome, Brave, and Edge use App-Bound Encryption (V20); Opera, Opera GX, and Vivaldi use DPAPI (V10); Firefox uses NSS-based encryption for logins and stores other data types unencrypted.

  • Chrome, Brave, Microsoft Edge (App-Bound / V20): cookies, saved logins, credit cards, OAuth tokens, autofill entries, browsing history, bookmarks.
  • Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi (DPAPI / V10): cookies, saved logins, credit cards, OAuth tokens (V10 + Base64 for Opera/Opera GX), autofill entries, browsing history, bookmarks.
  • Firefox (NSS): cookies, saved logins (AES-256-CBC or 3DES-CBC encrypted), OAuth tokens from signedInUser.json, autofill form history, browsing history, bookmarks.

Output is written as JSON to a file named <browser>Data.json by default, or to a path specified with the /o flag.

Installation

DumpBrowserSecrets is distributed as a pre-compiled Windows executable. No installation is required. Download the compiled binaries from the GitHub Releases page, copy DumpBrowserSecrets.exe and DllExtractChromiumSecrets.dll to the target host, and execute.

For operators who need to compile from source, the repository provides a Visual Studio solution file (DumpBrowserSecrets.sln) with three projects: Common, DllExtractChromiumSecrets, and DumpBrowserSecrets. Build in Visual Studio targeting x64 Release.

Usage

This repository does not provide a global --help flag in the traditional sense. The following usage block is reproduced verbatim from the README:

Usage: DumpBrowserSecrets.exe [options]

Options:
  /b:<browser> Target Browser: chrome, edge, brave, opera, operagx, vivaldi, firefox, all
               (default: system default browser)
  /o <file>    Output JSON File (default: <browser>Data.json)
  /all         Export All Entries (default: max 16 per category)
  /?           Show This Help Message

Examples:
  DumpBrowserSecrets.exe                            Extract 16 Entries From The Default Browser
  DumpBrowserSecrets.exe /b:chrome                  Extract 16 Entries From Chrome
  DumpBrowserSecrets.exe /b:firefox /all            Export All Entries From Firefox
  DumpBrowserSecrets.exe /b:brave /o Output.json    Extract 16 Entries From Brave To Output.json
  DumpBrowserSecrets.exe /b:all /all                Extract All From All Installed Browsers

By default, the tool extracts up to 16 entries per data category. The /all flag removes this cap. The /b:all flag targets every installed browser in a single run.

Attack Scenario

An operator lands on a developer workstation during a Windows assumed-breach engagement. The user is authenticated in Chrome to GitHub, an AWS console, Okta, and the company’s internal GitLab instance. LSASS is protected by Credential Guard and yields no useful information. The operator drops DumpBrowserSecrets.exe and its accompanying DLL to a writable directory and executes the following:

DumpBrowserSecrets.exe /b:all /all /o C:\Users\Public\out.json

The tool spawns a headless Chrome process, injects the DLL via Early Bird APC injection, and retrieves the App-Bound Encryption key via the IElevator COM interface, and decrypts the Login Data, Cookies, and Web Data SQLite databases. The resulting JSON contains active session cookies for all authenticated SaaS services, OAuth refresh tokens that survive password resets, saved plaintext credentials, and autofill data, including internal hostnames and usernames.

The operator then pipes the OAuth tokens to evilreplay for session replay against the target’s cloud services, and uses CredNinja to validate any recovered plaintext credentials against the domain before they are rotated. The entire credential extraction phase completes in under 30 seconds on a live endpoint.

Red Team Relevance

Browser credential theft is one of the most consistent post-exploitation steps in real-world intrusions. The infostealer market, including Redline, Raccoon, Vidar, and Lumma Stealer, is built almost entirely on the same primitives DumpBrowserSecrets implements. The distinction is that DumpBrowserSecrets is built for red team engagements rather than commodity malware deployment: it outputs structured JSON rather than exfiltrating to a C2 panel, and its evasion features are designed to survive EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) scrutiny on hardened enterprise endpoints, not targeting unmonitored consumer machines.

App-Bound Encryption was Google’s deliberate attempt to raise the cost of this technique when it shipped in Chrome 127. It largely succeeded against older tools that relied solely on DPAPI decryption. DumpBrowserSecrets is one of the more complete public implementations of the IElevator COM bypass, making it directly relevant for testing whether an organisation’s endpoint controls detect or prevent this class of attack.

The tool is also useful for testing the realistic blast radius of a compromised developer endpoint, a scenario that is systematically underweighted in many assumed-breach exercises that focus on Active Directory paths while ignoring the SaaS credential surface.

Detection and Mitigation

Key detection opportunities are: process injection into a Chromium browser process from an unexpected parent, headless browser instantiation outside of CI/CD or automation contexts, reads against browser SQLite databases (Login Data, Cookies, Web Data) by processes other than the browser executable itself, and calls to the IElevator COM interface from non-browser processes.

The PPID and argument spoofing in DumpBrowserSecrets are specifically designed to defeat process lineage-based detection. EDR products that monitor IElevator COM interface calls directly, or that flag headless browser instantiation by process behaviour rather than ancestry alone, will be more effective against this technique.

At the policy level, credential managers that store secrets outside the browser (native desktop clients for Bitwarden, 1Password, or similar) avoid this attack surface entirely. Browser-stored passwords remain the weakest link in credential hygiene in most enterprise environments.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does DumpBrowserSecrets work on Chrome 127 and later with App-Bound Encryption enabled?

Yes. DumpBrowserSecrets is specifically designed to bypass App-Bound Encryption as implemented in Chrome 127 and later. It spawns a headless Chromium process, injects its DLL via Early Bird APC injection, and uses the IElevator COM interface from within the browser process context to decrypt the app_bound_encrypted_key. This makes it effective against current Chrome, Brave, and Microsoft Edge builds.

What browsers does DumpBrowserSecrets support?

DumpBrowserSecrets supports Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi, and Firefox. Chrome, Brave, and Edge are handled via App-Bound Encryption bypass. Opera, Opera GX, and Vivaldi use DPAPI decryption. Firefox uses NSS-based decryption with no DLL injection required.

What data does DumpBrowserSecrets extract?

The tool extracts saved passwords, session cookies, OAuth refresh tokens, credit card numbers, autofill entries, browsing history, and bookmarks. Output is written as JSON to a file named after the target browser by default.

Does DumpBrowserSecrets require the target browser to be running?

For Chromium-based browsers using App-Bound Encryption, the tool spawns its own headless process to access the IElevator COM interface, so the browser does not need to be open. Handle duplication is used to bypass file locks on SQLite databases that may be held by a running browser instance.

Is DumpBrowserSecrets detected by antivirus or EDR?

The tool includes compile-time string obfuscation, API hashing, PPID spoofing via NtCreateUserProcess, and argument spoofing to reduce its static and behavioural detection footprint. Detection rates vary by product. EDR solutions that monitor IElevator COM interface calls by non-browser processes, or flag headless browser instantiation by process behaviour rather than parent lineage, are more likely to detect it.

What is the difference between DumpBrowserSecrets and Mimikatz for credential harvesting?

Mimikatz targets Windows credential stores including LSASS memory and the Security Account Manager (SAM). DumpBrowserSecrets focuses exclusively on browser-stored credentials, which exist in a separate layer that Mimikatz does not address. In environments where Credential Guard protects LSASS, browser credential harvesting is often the more reliable post-exploitation path.

Conclusion

DumpBrowserSecrets is a technically well-constructed post-exploitation tool that addresses a credential surface that most endpoint hardening programmes treat as an afterthought. Its coverage of the full range of major browsers, correct handling of both App-Bound Encryption and DPAPI models, and inclusion of operational evasion features make it a credible addition to a red team toolkit for assumed-breach engagements where the goal is to demonstrate realistic credential exposure beyond the traditional LSASS path.

You can read more or download DumpBrowserSecrets here: https://github.com/Maldev-Academy/DumpBrowserSecrets

Systemic Ransomware Events in 2025 - How Jaguar Land Rover Showed What a Category 3 Supply Chain Breach Looks Like

Systemic Ransomware Events in 2025 – How Jaguar Land Rover Showed What a Category 3 Supply Chain Breach Looks Like

Views: 2,794

Jaguar Land Rover’s prolonged cyber outage in 2025 turned what would once have been a “single victim” ransomware story into a macroeconomic event, with factory shutdowns, government intervention, and thousands of suppliers left exposed. Reporting on the incident described a multi-week production halt, an estimated loss of tens of millions of pounds per week, and visible strain across the wider UK manufacturing ecosystem as summarised by Reuters’ coverage of the shutdown. For CISOs and security leaders, JLR is no longer just a case study, it is the reference example of what a “category-3” supply chain ransomware event looks like.

Systemic Ransomware Events in 2025 - How Jaguar Land Rover Showed What a Category 3 Supply Chain Breach Looks Like

Trend Overview: From Single Victims to Systemic Events

Across 2024 and 2025, the centre of gravity for ransomware shifted from isolated IT incidents to systemic events that ripple through entire sectors. IBM’s latest threat intelligence index highlights manufacturing as the most attacked industry for the fourth year in a row, accounting for more than a quarter of observed incidents, with many of those attacks involving extortion, data theft, or operational disruption according to IBM’s 2025 Threat Intelligence Index. In other words, the JLR story is not an outlier, it sits on top of a trend where physical production and upstream suppliers are now directly in scope.

At the same time, attackers are professionalising their routes to impact. Valid accounts, access brokered on darknet markets, and exploitation of public-facing applications are now more common than noisy phishing waves as the first step in a compromise. Kaspersky’s incident response data for 2024 shows public-facing applications as the top initial vector, with valid accounts representing more than 30 percent of investigated intrusions, and specifically notes the enabling role of Initial Access Brokers selling credentials to Ransomware-as-a-Service crews in its 2024 incident response report. Those figures match what you already see in dark web listings for VPN credentials, Citrix gateways, and OT remote access portals.

On the defender side, many organisations still treat “ransomware” as a local IT disaster scenario instead of a systemic category of risk. The JLR incident, and earlier automotive hits, illustrate a different reality: a single compromise in a critical supplier or shared platform can interrupt thousands of vehicles per day, disrupt national GDP figures, and drag small suppliers to the edge of insolvency. For readers who follow the economics of exploitation, this pattern connects directly to how access and tooling are traded in underground markets, something we explored in more depth in Inside Dark Web Exploit Markets in 2025.

Campaign Analysis / Case Studies

Case Study 1: Jaguar Land Rover – When Ransomware Becomes a Macro Event

Jaguar Land Rover’s cyber incident did not just stop production for a few days; it flipped the company from profit into a quarterly loss and generated measurable drag on the wider UK economy. Public reporting indicates JLR suffered pre-tax losses of roughly £485 million in the quarter covering the attack, with almost £200 million recorded as direct exceptional costs tied to incident response and system recovery as detailed in The Guardian’s coverage of the company’s results. UK government figures later estimated the wider impact of the outage and supply chain slowdown at up to £1.9 billion in lost economic output.

The cyberattack forced JLR to close factories for much of September, with a phased restart only beginning in October. Supplier liquidity became a policy concern, prompting a government-backed loan guarantee facility worth up to £1.5 billion to stabilise the ecosystem. For CISOs, this is a clean example of a category-3 event: the incident affected enterprise IT, OT, dealer systems, and critical suppliers, and required direct government support to keep the chain intact. It also exposed gaps in cyber insurance coverage and raised uncomfortable questions about how boards evaluate “tail risk” on OT, ERP, and dealer platforms.

Case Study 2: Toyota and Kojima Industries – Historical Template for Supply Chain Shutdown

While JLR is the freshest example, the industry has already seen what happens when a single supplier becomes a single point of failure. In 2022, Toyota halted operations across 28 production lines in 14 plants after a reported cyberattack at plastic parts supplier Kojima Industries, which caused a system failure and forced a full-day shutdown of domestic manufacturing. Public estimates at the time suggested a production impact of around 13,000 vehicles, roughly five percent of Toyota’s monthly domestic output as reported by BleepingComputer’s coverage of the incident. Although operations resumed relatively quickly, the event highlighted the fragility of just-in-time manufacturing when upstream IT systems are compromised.

Toyota’s case serves as historical context for 2025. It showed that even a one-day outage at a critical supplier can have measurable production consequences. JLR’s multi-week shutdown, by contrast, demonstrates how much worse the systemic impact becomes when the victim is the OEM itself, and when the attack lands in a supply chain that spans tens of thousands of jobs and hundreds of small manufacturers with far less resilience than the flagship brand.

Case Study 3: Ferrari – Data Extortion Without OT Downtime

Not every systemic event involves factory shutdowns. In 2023, Ferrari reported a cyber incident in which attackers demanded a ransom related to customer contact details, but production and core operations continued. The company notified affected clients and brought in external investigators, but made clear it would not pay the ransom as described in Reuters’ report on the incident. For many luxury brands, that “no downtime, but sensitive data exposed” outcome is a more realistic scenario than a total OT outage.

Even without visible production impact, high-profile data extortion against brands like Ferrari carries systemic risk. Leaked customer and supplier data has value to criminal groups beyond the initial ransom demand, from bespoke phishing to social engineering against dealers and partners. For automotive CISOs, the lesson is that ransomware and data theft campaigns can create systemic exposure even when the plant keeps running and the only visible symptom is a regulatory notification and some bruised PR.

Detection Vectors and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

The common thread across these incidents is not a single “zero day,” but a mix of valid accounts, exposed services, and weaknesses in partner ecosystems. Kaspersky’s recent incident response analysis notes that public-facing applications were the primary initial vector in 39.2 percent of investigated cases, while valid accounts represented 31.4 percent, with many of those linked to credentials traded by Initial Access Brokers on the darknet in its 2024 data. That mix maps cleanly to well-known MITRE ATT&CK techniques, including Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190), Valid Accounts (T1078), and External Remote Services (T1133).

Once inside, modern ransomware crews behave more like patient intruders than smash-and-grab criminals. Coverage of the Akira ransomware group’s exploitation of a long-patched SonicWall SSLVPN flaw illustrates the pattern: chaining an access control vulnerability, weak default LDAP group settings, and misconfigured Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to obtain persistent access to edge devices, then pivoting to internal systems for encryption and exfiltration as documented in TechRadar’s summary of Rapid7’s advisory. Defenders who still anchor detection on “ransom note appears” or “mass encryption starts” are already too late for systemic events that unfold over weeks of silent lateral movement.

Industry Response and Law Enforcement

Industry guidance has slowly caught up with the reality that ransomware is now a supply chain and systemic risk problem, not just a local IT issue. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recommends treating supply chain security as a board-level topic, with a structured approach to understanding key suppliers, mapping dependencies, and embedding security requirements into contracts and onboarding in its supply chain security collection. For automotive and manufacturing sectors, that means extending visibility and monitoring beyond the plant to logistics providers, Tier-1 and Tier-2 suppliers, dealer networks, and even outsourced IT and finance functions.

On the offensive side of the chessboard, law enforcement has started to target the infrastructure that allows ransomware crews, access brokers, and hosting providers to operate at scale. Europol’s Operation Endgame, for example, focused on takedowns against a global cybercrime network that leveraged malware and botnets as part of the ransomware “kill chain,” disrupting command infrastructure and making it harder for crews to recycle toolchains across victims as described in Europol’s announcement of the operation. These actions matter, but they do not remove the need for enterprises to treat systemic ransomware as a predictable, modelled risk class rather than a string of bad luck headline events.

CISO Playbook: Treat Ransomware as a Category-3 Risk

For CISOs, the lesson from JLR, Toyota, and Ferrari is simple: assume that a ransomware or extortion crew will eventually have a path to your ecosystem, and focus on limiting how far an intrusion can propagate through suppliers and operations. That means treating ransomware scenarios with the same discipline as safety and business continuity planning, not as an afterthought in an endpoint protection strategy. It also means tying security investment back to the real economics of extortion and access markets, something we analysed more deeply in Ransomware Payments vs Rising Incident Counts in 2025.

  • Map your “category-3” blast radius by identifying which plants, suppliers, and shared platforms would create systemic impact if they were offline for four weeks, then align tabletop exercises to those specific scenarios.
  • Instrument external access and partner connectivity as first-class telemetry, including identity-centric logging for VPNs, OT gateways, and supplier portals, and treat anomalous access from valid accounts as a high-severity detection, not noise.
  • Push contractual and technical controls into the supply chain, including mandatory MFA, minimum logging standards, incident notification windows, and joint response playbooks with key suppliers and integrators.

Handled properly, systemic ransomware events become stress tests that the organisation can rehearse and model, not pure black swans. The JLR incident is a painful example, but it also gives boards and CISOs a concrete reference to work from: real losses, real downtime, and a clear picture of what happens when extortion campaigns scale beyond a single victim into an entire industrial ecosystem.

This article is for educational and defensive purposes only. It does not endorse or promote illegal activity.

SmbCrawler - SMB Share Discovery and Secret-Hunting

SmbCrawler – SMB Share Discovery and Secret-Hunting

Views: 2,560

SmbCrawler is a credentialed SMB spider that takes domain credentials and a list of hosts, then aggressively walks network shares for you. It checks permissions, crawls directory trees, auto-downloads interesting files, and reports likely secrets such as passwords, SSH keys, configuration files, DPAPI blobs, and database dumps. For internal red teams, it is a purpose-built engine for turning “we have a foothold” into “we own the file servers”.

SmbCrawler - SMB Share Discovery and Secret-Hunting

Overview

Every serious internal pentest or red-team engagement ends up abusing SMB misconfiguration. Shared drives still hold plaintext creds, exported mailboxes, unprotected backups, and “temporary” dumps that never got cleaned up. Doing this manually with basic tools and Windows Explorer is slow and noisy. SmbCrawler solves that by automating the boring parts:

  • Take credentials once.
  • Feed it hostnames, IP ranges, or Nmap XML.
  • Let it enumerate shares, permissions, and directory structures at scale.
  • Automatically pull down files that match secret-hunting profiles into a structured SQLite-backed data store.

The result is an internal discovery and exfil pipeline that you can run in hours, not days, with a repeatable output format you can grep, query, and report from.

Features

From the live README, SmbCrawler ships with a carefully designed feature set:

  • Flexible target input – accepts hostnames, single IPs, IP ranges or Nmap XML files as input.
  • Permission checks – tests authentication as guest and as supplied user, share access, and (optionally) write access by creating a temporary directory.
  • Configurable crawl depth – control how deep to walk each share, with separate profiles to override depth for specific paths.
  • Pass-the-hash support – operate with NTLM hashes instead of cleartext passwords when necessary.
  • Interesting file detection – ships with profiles that flag and download likely high-value files (credentials, configs, dumps, keys).
  • Threaded, pausable engine – multi-threaded crawling with runtime controls to pause, skip hosts or shares, and inspect status.
  • SQLite-backed output – writes findings to a SQLite database and a structured output directory, plus optional interactive HTML reporting.

Installation

SmbCrawler is a Python tool published on PyPI. The author explicitly recommends using pipx so you do not pollute your system Python. Installation examples from the README:

# Minimal install
pipx install smbcrawler

# Recommended install with binary conversion helpers (PDF, XLSX, DOCX, ZIP...)
pipx install "smbcrawler[binary-conversion]"

The extra [binary-conversion] dependency pulls in MarkItDown so SmbCrawler can convert common binary formats to text before scanning them for secrets. For red-team use, you almost always want this turned on.

Usage

The README’s quick example shows a typical crawl against a file of targets with domain credentials:

$ smbcrawler crawl -i hosts.txt -u pen.tester -p iluvb0b -d contoso.local -t 10 -D 5

That command:

  • Uses hosts.txt as the target list.
  • Authenticates as pen.tester in the contoso.local domain.
  • Spawns 10 worker threads (-t 10).
  • Crawls each share up to depth 5 (-D 5).

At runtime, you can interact with the crawler:

  • p – pause and selectively skip hosts or shares.
  • <space> – print current progress.
  • s – show a more detailed status view.

The profile system does the heavy lifting. Profiles (YAML) define which files, directories, and shares are “interesting”, where to dig deeper, and which secrets to flag. You can supply your own profiles alongside the built-in defaults to target specific line-of-business apps or internal naming schemes.

Attack Scenario

Objective: turn one compromised Windows credential into complete knowledge of SMB data exposure, plus a curated bag of loot, in a single engagement sprint.

  1. Obtain valid domain credentials via phishing, password spraying or a prior foothold.
  2. Enumerate potential SMB hosts using existing tools (for example keimpx or Nmap scripts) and export them to a target file.
  3. Run SmbCrawler with a shallow depth (for example -D 1) and optional write checks to map which hosts and shares are readable and writable. Save this as a dedicated crawl file.
  4. Use the initial database to prioritise “high-value” shares, then rerun SmbCrawler with deeper depth and tuned profiles against a reduced host set.
  5. From the SQLite database and downloaded files, extract passwords, SSH keys, VPN configs, DPAPI blobs, application secrets and database dumps. Feed those into lateral movement tooling such as NetExec to pivot further.
  6. Optionally, map resulting privileges and paths in Active Directory with BloodHound, turning share-level findings into full graph-based attack paths.

Red Team Relevance

SmbCrawler hits a rare sweet spot between practicality and depth. It is fast enough to run routinely on real client networks, and opinionated enough to surface valuable loot instead of dumping terabytes of junk. From a red-team perspective, you can:

  • Quantify SMB exposure: “X hosts, Y readable shares, Z with write access, N high-value secrets found”.
  • Build repeatable playbooks for different client environments by shipping pre-tuned profiles with your engagement kit.
  • Tighten operational security: SmbCrawler lets you avoid noisy manual browsing and random PowerShell scripts scattered through jump boxes.

It also plays nicely with other offensive SMB tooling already covered on Darknet. Combine share discovery and credential validation (keimpx, CredNinja, NetExec) with SmbCrawler’s deep crawl to show how quickly a motivated attacker can move from “one set of creds” to “everyone’s home drive” in a typical enterprise.

Detection and Mitigation

From the blue-team side, SmbCrawler’s capabilities translate directly into controls you should prioritise:

  • Audit share permissions regularly – especially “Everyone” and “Authenticated Users” access on sensitive roots and profile shares.
  • Harden write access – limit where regular users can create directories and files; SmbCrawler’s write-check feature highlights exactly where an attacker could drop tooling or weaponised documents.
  • Reduce sensitive data on shares – remove or encrypt cleartext passwords, SSH keys, DPAPI master keys, and dumps from general-purpose shares.
  • Monitor for unusual enumeration patterns – multi-threaded crawlers often create recognisable patterns in SMB logs. Look for high-volume directory listings and repeated access to new hosts from a single source.
  • Feed SmbCrawler-like data into DLP and UEBA – if you cannot prevent broad read access, at least detect when unusual principals traverse large portions of your file estate.

Comparison

SmbCrawler sits in a crowded but uneven space:

  • Versus simple scanners (keimpx, basic Nmap scripts) – those excel at credential validity and share enumeration, but they do not deeply crawl content or classify secrets. SmbCrawler keeps going until it finds the actual loot.
  • Versus manual PowerShell and ad-hoc scripts – bespoke scripts are flexible but rigid to maintain and report from. SmbCrawler’s SQLite output and profile system provide a single, consistent source of truth per engagement.
  • Versus general recon frameworks (Sn1per, Scanners-Box) – frameworks give you breadth across many protocols; SmbCrawler gives you depth for one of the most abused internal attack surfaces: Windows file shares.

Conclusion

If your internal engagements touch Windows networks, SmbCrawler deserves a permanent slot in your toolkit. It turns a messy mix of SMB servers, legacy shares, and forgotten exports into a structured map of permissions and secrets you can actually act on. For defenders, running it in a controlled way gives you a painful but accurate picture of real data exposure – the same image a motivated attacker would see.

You can read more or download SmbCrawler here: https://github.com/SySS-Research/smbcrawler

Heisenberg Dependency Health Check - GitHub Action for Supply Chain Risk

Heisenberg Dependency Health Check – GitHub Action for Supply Chain Risk

Views: 1,717

Heisenberg Dependency Health Check is a GitHub Action that inspects only the new or modified dependencies introduced in a pull request. It analyses lockfiles or manifest changes, gathers health and risk signals from deps.dev and other heuristics, and posts a detailed dependency health report directly on the pull request. It highlights suspicious, low-quality, or unusually fresh packages before they reach your main branch.

Heisenberg Dependency Health Check - GitHub Action for Supply Chain Risk

Overview

Modern supply-chain attacks increasingly rely on introducing malicious or low-trust dependencies through everyday development workflows. Traditional scanners often run periodically and focus on known vulnerabilities, which miss early indicators of risk. Heisenberg takes a different approach: it hooks directly into the pull request, detects which packages were added or updated, and reviews them in isolation. Running at merge time, it gives reviewers actionable risk signals exactly when decisions are made.

The tool is ecosystem-agnostic and supports Python, JavaScript, and Go dependency formats. It can detect unusual publish timings, maintenance red flags, popularity issues, suspicious scripts, and other patterns associated with supply-chain compromise. If configured, it can also label or block pull requests that exceed risk thresholds.

Features

  • Delta-based scanning: evaluates only new or changed dependencies rather than rescanning the entire dependency graph.
  • Multi-ecosystem support: works with poetry.lock, requirements.txt, uv.lock, package-lock.json, yarn.lock and go.mod.
  • Risk and health signals: pulls advisories, maintenance metrics, popularity data, dependents, and incredibly fresh publishes that may indicate rushed or suspicious releases.
  • npm script checks: highlights post-install script behaviours that attackers frequently abuse.
  • Pull request reporting: posts a structured dependency health comment with links to package intelligence sources.
  • Policy controls: can add a security review label or fail the job if risky packages are introduced.

Installation

The following workflow is taken directly from the Heisenberg documentation and should be placed inside .github/workflows/ in your repository. It monitors standard dependency files and runs the action whenever one of them changes.

name: Heisenberg Health Check
on:
  pull_request:
    paths:
      - "**/poetry.lock"
      - "**/uv.lock"
      - "**/package-lock.json"
      - "**/yarn.lock"
      - "**/requirements.txt"
      - "**/go.mod"

permissions:
  contents: read
  pull-requests: write
  issues: write

jobs:
  deps-health:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Detect changed manifest
        id: detect
        run: |
          git fetch origin ${{ github.base_ref }} --depth=1
          LOCK_PATH=$(git diff --name-only origin/${{ github.base_ref }} | \
            grep -E 'poetry.lock$|uv.lock$|package-lock.json$|yarn.lock$|requirements.txt$|go.mod$' | head -n1 || true)
          echo "lock_path=$LOCK_PATH" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT

      - name: Heisenberg Dependency Health Check
        uses: AppOmni-Labs/heisenberg-ssc-gha@v1
        with:
          package_file: ${{ steps.detect.outputs.lock_path }}

Usage

Once the workflow is active, the process is automatic:

  • A pull request modifies a dependency manifest.
  • The workflow detects the change and hands the specific file to Heisenberg.
  • Heisenberg evaluates only the added or modified packages.
  • A health report appears as a comment on the pull request.
  • Optional: risky changes can trigger a label or cause the job to fail, blocking the merge.

Teams using additional GitHub Action hardening tools, such as Claws, can pair Heisenberg with workflow linting to reduce risks from both automated misuse and compromised dependencies.

Attack Scenario

Objective: demonstrate how a hostile dependency attempt would be detected during a realistic development flow.

  1. Set up a demo repository with the Heisenberg workflow enabled.
  2. Add or bump a dependency known for suspicious activity, poor maintenance, or very recent publishes.
  3. Open a pull request as if performing a routine update.
  4. Heisenberg evaluates only the changed dependency and posts a health report highlighting all relevant concerns.
  5. Point stakeholders to the flagged signals as evidence of supply-chain risk and why automated guardrails matter.

This adversarial modelling pairs well with internal reviews using Darknet’s write-ups on automation abuse, such as Weaponizing Dependabot, helping teams understand how automated tooling can be exploited without proper controls.

Red Team Relevance

Although Heisenberg is built for defenders, red teams can use it to:

  • Identify weak or unvetted dependency update practices in target environments.
  • Model realistic compromise paths that depend on dependency injection or typosquatting.
  • Show how quickly risk would be caught if the organisation had Heisenberg or similar controls in place.

It also pairs naturally with supply-chain reconnaissance tools and GitHub workflow analysis techniques. For example, secret-exposure tools like Veles excel at key detection, while OAuth-abuse research such as GitPhish highlights broader risks inside CI/CD ecosystems.

Detection and Mitigation

  • Restrict dependency changes to pull requests so that Heisenberg has complete visibility.
  • Centralise reports so security teams can see patterns across repositories.
  • Harden GitHub workflows to prevent bypass paths; tools like Claws help enforce safe workflow practices.
  • Threat model dependency automation using lessons from Darknet’s coverage of Dependabot exploitation and broader CI/CD abuse.
  • Introduce routine chaos tests using intentionally risky but harmless packages to ensure detection logic remains effective.

Comparison

Heisenberg differs from scheduled composition scanners by focusing on changes rather than the full dependency tree. It gives teams real-time merge-time intelligence without slowing developer workflows. Compared to broader GitHub workflow hardening tools, it focuses specifically on package-level supply-chain risk, making it a complementary part of a complete CI/CD security posture.

Conclusion

Heisenberg Dependency Health Check provides a high-signal, low-friction control to catch risky dependencies during code review. By focusing strictly on the packages developers are adding or updating, it keeps supply-chain risk visible without overwhelming teams with noise. It is a practical upgrade for any team that relies heavily on open-source packages and wants to prevent supply-chain compromise before it enters the build pipeline.

You can read more or download Heisenberg Dependency Health Check here: https://github.com/AppOmni-Labs/heisenberg-ssc-gha

Dark Web Search Engines in 2025 - Enterprise Monitoring, APIs and IOC Hunting

Dark Web Search Engines in 2025 – Enterprise Monitoring, APIs and IOC Hunting

Views: 3,830

Dark web search engines have become essential for enterprise security teams that need early visibility into leaked credentials, impersonation attempts, and supply chain exposures. Monitoring hidden services is no longer the domain of researchers or enthusiasts. Modern platforms now offer structured APIs, bulk data feeds, and automated alerting pipelines that slot directly into SOC and threat intelligence workflows. This operational transition aligns with observations from Dark Reading’s analysis of what makes threat intelligence effective, which highlights the need to turn external exposure data into outcomes that matter to the business.

Dark Web Search Engines in 2025 - Enterprise Monitoring, APIs and IOC Hunting

Trend Overview

Historically, dark web search engines were limited to poorly indexed onion services and unstable crawlers. By 2024 and 2025, the landscape shifted toward enterprise-grade monitoring platforms capable of indexing tens of thousands of onion services, forums, ransomware leak sites, breach repositories, and Telegram channels. These systems now incorporate entity recognition, clustering of related content, and automated scanning for leaked credentials or sensitive corporate identifiers. This mirrors trends seen in the broader criminal marketplace ecosystem, including the structured listings and access bundles analysed in Inside Dark Web Exploit Markets in 2025, where underground economies continue to industrialise around automated tooling and aggregation.

Technical research continues to examine the indexing and retrieval challenges of Tor-specific search engines. Hidden services appear and disappear frequently, rankings are inconsistent, and duplicated content complicates classification. Academic work analysing dark web search architectures highlights how crawling delays, content volatility, and unpredictable link structures impact data quality. One recent study assessed the retrieval performance of Tor-focused search engines and identified structural weaknesses in their ranking algorithms. A 2025 study on retrieval and ranking strategies for Tor search engines examined these limitations in detail.

As demand grows, enterprise organisations now treat dark web monitoring as a staple of external threat intelligence. Consumer-oriented guides have been replaced by platform reviews focused on API access, automated scanning, and integration into SIEM pipelines. A 2025 assessment of dark web monitoring practices described how businesses increasingly track leaked credentials and impersonation attempts through unified dashboards. Onerep’s overview of dark web monitoring reinforces this shift. For defenders, the emphasis is on high-quality data extraction, not on manually browsing hidden services.

Campaign Analysis / Case Studies

Case Study 1, Leaked credentials and rapid ransomware activation

Several 2024–2025 ransomware incidents began with leaked corporate VPN credentials appearing on dark web search platforms. In a typical pattern, valid credentials are harvested by info-stealer malware, sold on underground markets, and then used by ransomware operators to authenticate to corporate networks. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has documented how the Akira ransomware group gains initial access through compromised VPN credentials and other exposed remote services, often moving quickly from login to encryption. CISA’s #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware advisory confirms that valid accounts and VPN appliances are core entry points in modern campaigns.

Case Study 2, Supply chain software vendor hit by ransomware

Ransomware targeting a supply chain software provider illustrates how third-party exposures can cascade. In late 2024, logistics and retail customers were warned after a major supply chain planning vendor, Blue Yonder, disclosed a ransomware incident that disrupted parts of its operations. The attack raised concerns about downstream risks to retailers and manufacturers that depend on its software. The Register reported on the Blue Yonder ransomware attack, noting the potential for disruption across critical supply chains. For defenders, this is a reminder that monitoring for leaked credentials and data involving key vendors is as important as watching their own estate.

Case Study 3, Brand impersonation detected via search engine APIs

A financial services firm faced a wave of fraudulent onion sites imitating its customer portal. These sites circulated across hidden service forums and attempted to harvest credentials from targeted victims. The impersonation was discovered when the company’s monitoring system flagged new cloned domains through dark web search API alerts. The firm issued takedown requests, adjusted customer communication policies, and expanded surveillance of brand variations. Law enforcement agencies regularly emphasise the scale and impact of such phishing and impersonation networks. Europol’s account of a multi-million-euro phishing gang takedown shows how these criminal infrastructures can defraud large numbers of victims before they are dismantled.

Detection Vectors / TTPs

Dark web search engines enable defenders to detect reconnaissance and staging activities long before an attack begins. Many credential-theft operations rely on info-stealer malware campaigns that extract browser-stored passwords and authentication tokens. These stolen credentials then appear for sale across hidden markets or leak repositories, which are indexed by monitoring engines. This pattern aligns with findings from Kaspersky, which identified valid accounts as a significant attack vector and highlighted how stolen credentials are reused in high-impact incidents. Kaspersky reported substantial use of valid accounts in 2024 attacks.

IOC hunting is a primary use case for enterprise users. Teams search for leaked email addresses, password pairs, customer data fragments, session tokens, malware hashes, and early-stage chatter related to emerging campaigns. These indicators often appear on dark web platforms weeks before active exploitation. The approach complements broader monitoring of dark web marketplaces, especially those offering access, exploits, or compromised credentials. A related investigation on darknet.org.uk examined how underground economies operate and why defenders benefit from watching these platforms. Exploit-as-a-Service Resurgence in 2025 shows how structured markets combine tooling, access, and stolen data, reinforcing the need to track associated indicators.

Industry Response / Law Enforcement

Law enforcement actions continue across dark web markets, phishing networks, ransomware leak sites, and stolen data hubs. Coordinated operations between international agencies have disrupted access brokers, arrested operators of fraudulent portals, and removed infrastructure used to distribute stolen data. Europol and Eurojust have documented several such efforts, including operations against phishing-as-a-service platforms and criminal marketplaces. Europol’s description of the LabHost phishing-as-a-service takedown provides a clear view of how infrastructure-focused enforcement can disrupt large-scale credential theft.

Industry vendors have expanded their offerings to include domain monitoring, impersonation detection, credential leak alerting, and integration with SIEM or SOAR platforms. Recent analysis explains how dark web monitoring integrates into enterprise workflows, focusing on automated scanning and alerting functions rather than manual browsing. TechRadar’s overview of dark web monitoring outlines how organisations use these tools to detect leaked data earlier and reduce the window in which attackers can act.

CISO Playbook

  • Integrate dark web monitoring feeds into SOC processes to detect leaked credentials, impersonation domains, and external exposures related to supply chain partners.
  • Use IOC-hunting workflows to identify leaked email addresses, password pairs, session tokens, and malware hashes across hidden services, then link those indicators back to specific assets and business processes.
  • Adopt brand protection measures with automated scanning for fraudulent domains, cloned portals, and unauthorised use of corporate identity, and ensure communications teams know how to respond when impersonation is discovered.

This article covers dark web monitoring practices for authorised defensive use only.

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