The news this week has been a flaw in Microsoft‘s all versions of Windows labeled as the “Black Screen of Death”, they did acknowledge the problem a few days ago (in a roundabout way) but basically said it wasn’t their fault and it wasn’t widespread.

The blame is currently being passed around and as of now, no-one really knows exactly what is going on. With Prevx leading up the initial claims that the newest batch of November updates pushed out by Microsoft caused the problem.

Users who want the best Windows experience will need some help from Microsoft. But if the Black Screen of Death case is any indication, Microsoft isn’t so quick to take responsibility. As usual, users find they are left to their own devices to solve problems with software and hardware they paid good money for.

For too long, users have been forced by default to deal with the many security problems that plague the Windows ecosystem. Whether because of malware, flaws in how Microsoft built Windows or any other number of things that can occur in the course of using a Windows PC, it seems that users have to look to their own knowledge and resources to maintain at least a basic level of security.

It has gotten so bad that today, no anti-malware program is capable of targeting and removing every malicious file that can potentially impact a Windows installation. Even with several anti-malware tools installed, not a single Windows user is absolutely safe. And in order to come closer to achieving that lofty goal, the user needs to be diligent, always keeping in mind that if trouble strikes, it could very well be a battle with a malicious hacker.

It’s a pretty crippling bug and very confusing for most users as it’s not a total kernel panic like the traditional Blue Screen of Death but starts up normally and allows you login.

The problem appears after you login when the entire screen is black, there is no menu, no system tray, no taskbar and only a single “My Computer” desktop icon.

Plus any non-technical users trying to remedy the problem will face a tough time, not all fixes work and it’s really an odd problem.

Perhaps that’s why the controversy over the Black Screen of Death has taken on such a life of its own in the past 24 hours. Just one day ago, Windows users experiencing a Black Screen of Death generally believed that the problem began with updates from Microsoft that they had installed.

But after investigating the situation, Microsoft responded late Dec. 1 saying it wasn’t at fault. And Prevx, the security company that initially suggested that Windows updates were to blame, has already backtracked. Once again users are left wondering what they can possibly do to keep from loosing time, data and even possibly cash to this glitch for which Microsoft apparently doesn’t want to take responsibility.

A lot of buck passing has been going on as per usual and the baggage ends up with the end user as per usual with issues pertaining to Microsoft.

It’s pretty heated at the moment so it’ll be interested to see what transpires over the next few days and if we will actually get some definitive answers (unlikely).

Wherever the fault actually lies, Windows 7 users are still left wondering what is going on and how they are supposed to fix it.

Source: eWeek

So a pretty serious remote vulnerability has been discovered in Windows 7, as usual Microsoft is downplaying the problem asking you to block the ports on your firewall rather than fixing the issue.

I’d imagine the problem would only really be a big issue inside networks as who exposes SMB ports to the outside world anyway (TCP ports 139 and 445).

But as we all know, the biggest threat to corporate network security ALWAYS comes from the inside.

Microsoft late on Friday confirmed that an unpatched vulnerability exists in Windows 7, but downplayed the problem, saying most users would be protected from attack by blocking two ports at the firewall.

In a security advisory , Microsoft acknowledged that a bug in SMB (Server Message Block), a Microsoft-made network file- and print-sharing protocol, could be used by attackers to cripple Windows 7 and Windows

The zero-day vulnerability was first reported by Canadian researcher Laurent Gaffie last Wednesday, when he revealed the bug and posted proof-of-concept attack code to the Full Disclosure security mailing list and his blog. According to Gaffie, exploiting the flaw crashes Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2 systems so thoroughly that the only recourse is to manually power off the computers.

At the time, Microsoft only said it was investigating Gaffie’s reports.

And well let’s face is, this is not the first time that a serious flaw that can be remotely exploited has been discovered in SMB.

It doesn’t seem like the most secure of protocols, I really doubt Microsoft developed it using SDL (Security Development Lifecycle).

It seems in this case though it’s limited to a DoS attack, perhaps due to all the fancy security controls Microsoft has implemented in the Windows 7 kernel.

Then on Friday, it took the next step and issued the advisory. “Microsoft is aware of public, detailed exploit code that would cause a system to stop functioning or become unreliable,” Dave Forstrom, a spokesman for Microsoft security group, said in an e-mail. “The company is not aware of attacks to exploit the reported vulnerability at this time.”

Forstrom echoed Gaffie’s comments earlier in the week that while an exploit could incapacitate a PC, the vulnerability could not be used by hackers to install malicious code on a Windows 7 system.

Both SMBv1 and its successor, SMBv2, contain the bug. “Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 and Windows 2000 are not affected,” assured Forstrom.

Attacks could be aimed at any browser, not just Internet Explorer (IE), Microsoft warned. After tricking users into visiting a malicious site or a previously-compromised domain, hackers could feed them specially-crafted URIs (uniform resource identifier), and then crash their PCs with malformed SMB packets.

Even so, I’m sure a skilled attacker could probably work out a way to drop some malicious code into the OS using this PoC and well if I know the underground they probably already are.

This vulnerability is the first official zero-day reported and confirmed by Microsoft in Windows 7 since the new operating system went on sale October 22nd.

I’m sure there will be many more.

Source: Network World

There have been a few stories about Windows 7, even one about Windows 7 UAC before and now it’s officially on sale I’d expect there to be many more.

As always malware and mass infections is a numbers game so the bad guys will always target the most popular and prolific operating systems to increase their chances of widespread infections.

For me personally UAC in Windows Vista was simply a pain in the ass, so much so I just turned it off completely as did most people rendering it completely ineffective. They seem to have toned it down in Windows 7 to make it less invasive and perhaps as a byproduct have made it less effective.

A researcher at Sophos reports putting Windows 7′s User Account Control feature to the test and finding the technology failed to block numerous pieces of malware. Microsoft, however, stresses that UAC is only one part of Windows 7′s security.

A researcher at Sophos called the UAC feature in Windows 7 ineffective after numerous pieces of malware snuck by the technology in a test.

Microsoft first introduced User Account Control in Windows Vista to improve security. After some users complained the number of alerts it generated were annoying, the company pledged to cut down on the number of prompts in Windows 7. The move however has raised concerns in the security community, and Sophos Senior Security Adviser Chester Wisniewski said his test proves Microsoft took it a step too far.

Wisniewski wrote on his blog Nov. 3 that seven of the 10 pieces of malware he tested ran with the default AUC enabled in Windows 7 without generating any prompts. As part of the test, no antivirus software was installed on the system. Two of the malware samples did not work in Windows 7; of the remaining eight, only one generated a prompt, and that one still would have been installed had the user clicked yes, Wisniewski told eWEEK.

I’d imagine it only throws an alert if the software being installed tries to modify system files or place itself in system directories (c:/windows etc).

That would make sense to me, and yes it would make it ineffective against malware and even more ineffective when the bad guys work out how it functions and adapt to that.

Nothing much new here though is it, run anything on Windows XP and you’ll get no warnings..so just be vigilant. I’d rather Microsoft try an educate people on good security practice rather than trying to implement half-arsed technical measures to protect against wetware ignorance.

When asked about the test, Microsoft officials pointed to the other features of Windows 7 that have improved security.

“Windows 7 is built upon the security platform of Windows Vista, which included a defense-in-depth approach to help protect customers from malware; this includes features like Security Development Lifecycle (SDL), User Account Control (UAC), Kernel Patch Protection, Windows Service Hardening, Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP),” a spokesperson said.

“Windows 7 retains all of the development processes, including going through the Security Development Lifecycle, and technologies that made Windows Vista the most secure Windows operating system ever released,” the spokesperson added. “Coupled with Internet Explorer 8—which includes added malware protection with its SmartScreen Filter—and Microsoft Security Essentials, Windows 7 provides flexible security protection against malware and intrusions.”.

All the above technologies are great and they do help a LOT when it comes to exploitation of vulnerabilities and trying to execute shell-code. But that’s not the biggest threat, the biggest threat is idiot users installing malware ‘by accident‘ on their own computers.

So yes, however obvious it may seem to us – you still need to install Anti-virus software on Windows 7.

Source: eWeek

This latest mass infection is through a vector I really don’t understand, see as though you can legitimately download Windows 7 from Microsoft.

I guess people just prefer BitTorrent downloads to HTTP downloads, and whoever had this smart idea capitalized on that.

Microsoft should perhaps do something about that and put out a legitimate BitTorrent copy. I guess the problem is updates, once it’s out there and people are seeding it’s out there for good and it’s not necessarily the latest build.

A Trojan buried within counterfeit copies of Windows 7 RC was used to build a botnet of compromised PCs.

The tactic emerged after researchers from security firm Damballa shut down the command and control servers used to control the system, reckoned to have drafted thousands of Windows PCs into its compromised ranks. Damballa reckons malicious hackers distributed the malware by hiding it within counterfeit copies of pre-release versions of Microsoft’s next operating system on offer through BitTorrent.

Damballa reckons that the pirated package was released around 24 April. By 10 May, when security researchers effectively curtailed the operation, as many as 552 new users were becoming infected per hour as a result of the attack.

It seems like the infection rate for this trojan has been pretty sharp, with 552 new users per hour that’s over 13,000 new infections per day adding up to almost 100,000 in one week.

The Command and Control center for the botnet has been taken offline though on May 10th so it’s rendered pretty useless since then.

I guess they should have built a more robust control mechanism like Conficker.

“Since the pirated package was released on 24 April, my best guess is that this botnet probably had at least 27,000 successful installs prior to our takedown of its CnC [command and control] on 10 May,” Tripp Cox, vice president of engineering at Damballa, told eWeek.

Since Damballa’s intervention, users installing the pirated version of Windows 7 RC are outside the control of the botmaster hackers running the attack. However, users who were compromised prior to 10 May remain within the ranks of the zombie drones controlled by the unidentified hackers.

Trend Micro identifies the Trojan featured in the attack as DROPPER-SPX.

Burying backdoors in counterfeit code is a popular tactic among crackers witnessed many times over the years with pirated copies of Microsoft applications and, more recently, with pirated versions of iWork ’09 for Apple Mac machines. In the case of the latest attack, prospective Windows 7 RC users get infected before they have a chance to install anti-virus tools, many of which are yet to support Windows 7 anyway.

You can check out the details on Trend Micro blog here.

If you want to get hold of Windows 7 you can just go directly to the Microsoft site here.

Source: The Register

It seems like Windows 7 is already creating some controversy even though it’s still in BETA. Just like Vista it also has UAC (User Access Control) which a lot of people disable completely because they find it irritating (myself included).

When that happens, the boundary between security and usability has crossed too far and the control becomes useless because people just remove it.

Thankfully in Windows 7 they have made it more configurable with 4 levels to choose from which offer various levels of protection vs usability (level 4 is the same as Vista and it comes default at level 3).

The controversy is with a VBScript run in user-mode the UAC can be disabled (set to level 1) without any kind of prompt happening.

A controversy erupted last week with the revelation by a researcher that it is possible for a user-mode program in Windows 7 to disable User Access Control in the default configuration. My first reaction to this was that it was bad, but it’s a beta and it will be fixed. Now I’m getting the vibe from Microsoft that it won’t be fixed and I can see their argument. It still leaves me uncomfortable though.

For those of you unfamiliar with the specific problem, in Windows 7 the default behavior of UAC was changed so that the user is not prompted for access to Windows programs, such as control panel applets, as they are in Vista. UAC also no longer uses the “secure desktop” mode for confirmation by default.

And a new control panel is provided to let the user choose the behavior of UAC in Windows 7. There is a slider control with 4 levels: level 4 is the same as Vista, with all the same prompting for system-level changes and secure desktop; level 3, the default, is the same as level 4, but doesn’t prompt for changes in Windows settings, like the control panel; level 2 is the same as level 3, but does not use the secure desktop; and level 1 shuts off UAC; no prompting at all. The secure desktop is a special mode in which you can only interact with the UAC prompt, and no other software.

It’s not really a vulnerability in the traditional sense of the word as it’s a design choice by Microsoft and only occurs under a certain set of circumstances. For example the user must be running as Administrator for a program to be able to disable UAC without prompting.

So if the machine is set up properly and day to day usage is logged in under a non-privileged account this won’t be an issue anyhow. The problem I see is, how often does that really happen?

Everyone just uses the Administrator account, so this could be a real problem.

The proof of concept showed a user-mode program which spoofed keystrokes and mouse movements to change the setting from the default down to level 1.

What bothered me was that this was user-mode code. It seemed to me that it sort-of violated at least the spirit of UAC by indirectly elevating privilege through an external program, which level 3 is supposed to prompt. The author of the attack proposed what seemed a sensible solution: force a prompt, one that requires secure desktop, for that one case. The heart of the argument for making this a special case is that users would expect from level 3 that it would protect them from elevation changes from external programs.

There was a lot of hyperbole about this issue. There are many legitimate arguments that this isn’t so bad a problem, and in fact not surprising at all. Some of them are made in Roger’s Security Blog, who closes with the point that a lot of the criticism is hypocritical, amounting to calls for more rigid prompting from people who complained about it in Vista..

The more I’ve thought about it, the more I think Microsoft is right not to make a change here. Here are the major arguments for this position.

The fact still remains, for this to be an issue – the user has to run a piece of untrusted code (even if it’s ‘just’ a VBScript) and once that has happened you can assume the machine is compromised anyway.

I’d imagine the script to carry out the actions will soon enough be flagged by Anti-virus software rendering it a little less of a threat.

Either way I’ll be paying close attention to the insecurity security of Windows 7 – I hope you will too.

Source: eWeek