Darknet - The Darkside

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07 April 2014 | 2,009 views

Sysdig – Linux System Troubleshooting Tool

Check For Vulnerabilities with Acunetix

Sysdig is open source, Linux System Troubleshooting Tool: capture system state and activity from a running Linux instance, then save, filter and analyze. Think of it as strace + tcpdump + lsof + awesome sauce. With a little Lua cherry on top.

Sysdig

Sysdig was born from a team’s constant frustration. System level troubleshooting is just way more of a pain than it should be — especially in distributed, virtualized, and cloud-based environments. So they took the lessons they learned while building network monitoring tools like WinPCap and Wireshark and created a new kind of system troubleshooting tool for Linux.

Sysdig captures system calls and other system level events using a linux kernel facility called tracepoints, which means much less overhead than strace.

It then “packetizes” this information, so that you can save it into trace files and filter it, a bit like you would do with tcpdump. This makes it very flexible to explore what processes are doing.

Sysdig is also packed with a set of scripts that make it easier to extract useful information and do troubleshooting.

To install Sysdig, just run this with sudo or as root:

Or read more here.



03 April 2014 | 691 views

Oracle Java Cloud Service Vulnerabilities Publicly Disclosed

Security researches from the Polish firm Security Explorations have released a massive slew of PoC code and technical details on 30 Oracle Java Cloud Service Vulnerabilities.

Java Cloud Vulnerabilities

It seems like they had already reported them to Oracle, but weren’t happy with how things were handled, so have decided to go public with the weaknesses. They gave them a fair amount of time too, over 2 months to address the issues in the cloud data centers.

As a fairly new service though, it seems Oracle is having some issues with policies and handling incidents like this for their cloud service.

Security researchers released technical details and proof-of-concept code for 30 security issues affecting Oracle’s Java Cloud Service, some of which could allow attackers to compromise business-critical Java applications deployed on it.

Researchers from Polish security firm Security Explorations, who found many Java vulnerabilities in the past, decided to publicly disclose the Java Cloud Service security weaknesses because they weren’t satisfied with how Oracle handled their private report.

“Two months after the initial report, Oracle has not provided information regarding successful resolution of the reported vulnerabilities in their commercial cloud data centers (US1 and EMEA1 respectively),” Adam Gowdiak, the CEO and founder of Security Explorations, said Wednesday via email.

“Instead, a year and a half after the commercial availability of the service, Oracle communicates that it is still working on cloud vulnerability handling policies,” he said. “Additionally, the company openly admits that it cannot promise whether it will be communicating resolution of security vulnerabilities affecting their cloud data centers in the future.”

The Oracle Java Cloud Service allows customers to run Java applications on WebLogic server clusters in data centers operated by Oracle. The service provides “enterprise security, high availability, and performance for business-critical applications,” Oracle says on its website.

According to a disclosure timeline published by Security Explorations, the company notified Oracle of 28 security issues on Jan. 31 and another two issues on Feb. 2.

It seems like Oracle has a fair amount of security measures built into the Java cloud (whitelisting, sandboxes etc) – but they don’t work properly. Which in my view, is often more dangerous than having none at all.

If people know there are no security measures, they will act and configure accordingly – especially for tech-centric platforms like this. But when the vendor, in this case Oracle, claims there are strong security measures in place – people will tend to relax their own implementation a little.

The reported issues include bypasses of the Java security sandbox, bypasses of the Java API whitelisting rules, the use of shared WebLogic server administrator passwords, the availability of security-sensitive plaintext user passwords in Policy Store, the use of outdated Java SE software on the service that was lacking around 150 security fixes, and issues that enable a remote code execution attack against a WebLogic server instance used by other Oracle Java Cloud users.

“We found a way for a given user of Oracle Java Cloud service to gain access to applications and data of another user of the service in the same regional data center,” Gowdiak said. “By access we mean the possibility to read and write data, but also execute arbitrary (including malicious) Java code on a target WebLogic server instance hosting other users’ applications; all with Weblogic server administrator privileges. That alone undermines one of key principles of a cloud environment — security and privacy of users data.”

Potential attackers only need one-time access to the service to learn its specifics and can later break into all Java Cloud user accounts from the public Internet, Gowdiak said. Attacks can also be carried out from trial accounts because there’s no separation between trial users and paying customers in the regional data centers, he said.

Oracle confirmed the 30 vulnerabilities on Feb. 12, but failed to provide Security Explorations with a monthly report on their status in March, as it had been agreed, Gowdiak said.

They are some quite serious issues too, allowed users to gain access to userspace of another user in the same regional DC. Oracle has confirmed the vulnerabilities, but as of yet – has failed to provide any status updates regarding fixes/improvements/patches etc.

The attacks can also be carried out from a trial user account as there is no separation between trial users and paying customers. It seems like a generally poor architecture and sloppy design by Oracle – I hope this makes them really step up their game.

Source: Network World


01 April 2014 | 1,476 views

Agnitio v2.1 Released – Manual Security Code Review Tool

A tool to help developers and security professionals conduct manual security code reviews in a consistent and repeatable way. Agnitio aims to replace the adhoc nature of manual security code review documentation, create an audit trail and reporting.

It hasn’t been updated for a fair while sadly, and v2.1 was released in 2011 – but still it’s a useful tool and a decent update. The last time we wrote about it was when Agnitio v2.0 was released back in August 2011.

Agnitio - Security Code Review

The major changes in v2.1 are listed below:

  • Windows x64 support
  • Automatically decompile Android .apk application to easily analyse the apps source code
  • Application profiles now have an application type of either web or mobile which allows only relevant checklist items to be displayed during the security code review
  • Create new checklist questions and mark them as web or mobile
  • C# and Java rules from the OWASP Code Crawler project have been imported into the Agnitio database and linked to relevant checklist questions

You can download Agnitio v2.1 here:

x64 – Agnitio x64.zip
x86 – Agnitio x86.zip

Or read more here.


26 March 2014 | 788 views

Security Vendor Trustwave Named In Target Suit

You might remember earlier in March, the Target CIO resigned due to the huge breach in December last year.

Now in an unprecedented move, the banks are suing Target’s security vendor – Trustwave. It’s a class-action suit accusing them of failing to detect the breach. It seems a bit of a stretch though, there’s no such thing as 100% as we all know, holding the security vendor responsible in this case seems a little unfair.

Trustwave

Security vendor Trustwave was accused in a class-action suit of failing to detect the attack that led to Target’s data breach, one of the largest on record.

Target, which is also named as a defendant, outsourced its data security obligations to Trustwave, which “failed to live up to its promises or to meet industry standards,” alleged the suit, filed Monday in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

Plaintiffs Trustmark National Bank of New York and Green Bank of Houston claim Target and Trustwave failed to stop the theft of 40 million payment card details and 70 million other personal records.

The lawsuit, one of dozens filed against Target, illustrates the growing frustration of banks burdened with the costs of reissuing compromised cards and their willingness to pull in other companies viewed as culpable into legal battles.

Support agreements between companies and security vendors are often confidential, and it was not clear from the suit how the banks determined Trustwave was one of Target’s contractors.

A Trustwave spokeswoman said Tuesday via email the company doesn’t confirm its customers or comment on pending legal matters. Target also said it also does not comment on pending litigation.

Everything factual seems to be legally shielded at the moment, as I would expect with any type of infosec related vendor. There will be NDAs in place and Trustwave have already stated that it’s against their policy to acknowledge who their clients are.

Also details about lawsuits don’t tend to come out until all parties are satisfied and the discussions are over.

The suit contends Target retained Trustwave to monitor its computer systems and ensure compliance with PCI-DSS, an industry security recommendation pushed by MasterCard and Visa to protect cardholder data from leaking.

Trustwave claims on its website to provide guidance to millions of businesses for compliance with PCI standards with testing and assessment teams.

Trustwave scanned Target’s network on Sept. 20, 2013 and told Target no vulnerabilities were found, the suit alleges.

Target has said it believed attackers stole the data between Nov. 27, 2013, and Dec. 15, 2013, via malicious software installed on point-of-sale devices.

The malware collected unencrypted payment card details after a card was swiped and briefly held in a computer’s memory, capitalizing on a unknown weakness despite years of efforts to harden payment systems.

U.S. banks have spent more than US$172 million reissuing cards, the suit said, citing figures from the Consumer Banker Association. The total cost of the breach to retailers and banks could exceed $18 billion, the suit claims.

The suit, which asks for a jury trial, seeks unspecified compensatory and statutory damages.

I don’t really think Trustwave is at fault here, from what I understand they are simply conducting PCI compliance scans. Which doesn’t cover any kind of deep, long term attack like this.

It covers basic, off the shelf, non zero-day vulnerabilities in software and web services. I think we’ll have to wait a little longer to get more details.

Source: Network World


17 March 2014 | 5,266 views

Blackhash – Audit Passwords Without Hashes

A traditional password audit typically involves extracting password hashes from systems and then sending those hashes to a third-party security auditor or an in-house security team. These security specialists have the knowledge and tools to effectively audit password hashes. They use password cracking software such as John the Ripper and Hashcat in an effort to uncover weak passwords.

Password Hashes

However, there are many risks associated with traditional password audits. The password hashes may be lost or stolen from the security team. A rogue security team member may secretly make copies of the password hashes. How would anyone know? Basically, once the password hashes are given to the security team, the system manager must simply trust that the password hashes are handled and disposed of securely and that access to the hashes is not abused.

Blackhash works by building a bloom filter from the system password hashes. The system manager extracts the password hashes and then uses Blackhash to build the filter. The filter is saved to a file, then compressed and given to the security team. The filter is just a bitset that contains ones and zeros. It does not contain the password hashes or any other information about the users or the accounts from the system. It’s just a string of ones and zeros. You may
view a Blackhash filter with a simple text editor. It will look similar to this:

00000100000001000100001

When the security team receives the filter, they use Blackhash to test it for known weak password hashes. If weak passwords are found, the security team creates a weak filter and sends that back to the system manager. Finally, the system manager tests the weak filter to identify individual users so that they can be contacted and asked to change passwords.

This enables you to audit passwords without actually giving out the hashes.

Pros

  • Password hashes never leave the system team.
  • Works with any simple, un-salted hash. LM, NT, MD5, SHA1, etc.
  • Security auditors do not have to transmit, handle or safe-guard the password hashes.
  • Anonymizes the users. The filter contains no data about the users at all.

Cons

  • Slower than traditional password cracking methods.
  • More complex than traditional password cracking methods.
  • Bloom Filters may produce a few false positives (very few in this case).

You can download Blackhash here:

Source – Blackhash_0.2.tar.gz
Windows – bh.exe

Or read more here.


14 March 2014 | 1,501 views

NSA Large Scale TURBINE Malware Also Target Sysadmins

So more revelations coming out about the NSA from the latest batch of documents leaked by Edward Snowden.

This time they detail a huge malware infection system created for widespread infections, it seems fairly advanced with the ability to spit out different types of malware depending on the target. Other than the TURBINE malware engine, there’s also some other interesting stuff like HAMMERSTEIN and HAMMERCHANT designed to intercept and snoop on VoIP and VPN connections.

NSA Turbine Malware

The latest batch of top-secret intelligence documents from the hoard collected by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden detail the massive increase in the agency’s use of its Tailored Access Operations (TAO) hacking unit – including a system dubbed TURBINE that can spam out millions of pieces of sophisticated malware at a time.

The presentation slides, published by The Intercept, show that 10 years ago the NSA had infiltrated and tapped a modest number of computers, but has since hugely bolstered its toolkit and increased its target list. Within eight years, the number of active pieces of implanted spyware was in the tens of thousands, and slides show an extensive arms catalog of malware for the TAO team to choose from.

“One of the greatest challenges for active SIGINT/attack is scale,” explained one presentation from 2009, marked top secret. “Human ‘drivers’ limit ability for large-scale exploitation (humans tend to operate within their own environment, not taking into account the bigger picture).”

The solution was to build TURBINE, which can carry out “automated implants by groups instead of individually,” and scale to operate millions of implants at a time. This command-and-control server includes an “expert system” that automatically picks the right malware for a victim and installs it on their computer, thus “relieve the [TURBINE] user from needing to know/care about the details.”

It’s some interesting stuff with discussions about scaling SIGINT attacks, there’s some pretty detailed analysis over here:

How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of Computers with Malware

Which includes decryption technology and plug-ins to grab web browsing logs, key strokes and record from the microphone.

TURBINE was active from at least July 2010, the documents state, and has infected up to 100,000 devices and machines, with more planned. According to the agency’s 2013 budget files, some of the $67.6m of taxpayer dollars allocated to the NSA’s TAO team went to maintaining and developing the system.

TURBINE also links into a NSA sensor system dubbed TURMOIL, which taps into computer networks around the world to monitor data traffic and identify potential targets. It can track down a mark from their email address or IP address, which device he or she is using, or by web cookies from Google, Microsoft, Twitter, Yahoo! and others.

While terrorist targets are mentioned, it’s clear from the documents that system administrators are also high on the todo list for the TAO team. One comment on an internal NSA message board system was titled simply: “I hunt sys admins.”

“Sys admins are a means to an end,” it states. “Once you have control of the IT manager’s computer then it’s easy to monitor any “government official that happens to be using the network some admin takes care of.”

Pwning the sysadmin is useful for malware attacks against large commercial routers and to defeat VPNs. The documents detail two pieces of NSA-developed malware, HAMMERCHANT and HAMMERSTEIN, which are designed to sit on routers and eavesdrop on VoIP traffic, and grab encryption keys to decrypt supposedly secure VPN connections, all in real time.

Targeting sysadmins is a means to an end, as if you can compromise them – you pretty much have access to everything, including core routers/switches/firewalls/vpn concentrators etc.

Plus servers and more if you can get hold of their SSH private key or passwords from keylogging/file grabbing etc.

Pretty hardcore stuff.

Source: The Register


11 March 2014 | 1,761 views

ODA – Online Web Based Disassembler

ODA stands for Online DisAssembler. ODA is a general purpose machine code disassembler that supports a myriad of machine architectures. Built on the shoulders of libbfd and libopcodes (part of binutils), ODA allows you to explore an executable by dissecting its sections, strings, symbols, raw hex, and machine level instructions.

ODA is an online Web Based Disassembler for when you don’t have time or space for a thick client.

ODA - On-line Web Based Disassembler

You can use it for a variety of purposes such as:

  • Malware analysis
  • Vulnerability research
  • Visualizing the control flow of a group of instructions
  • Disassembling a few bytes of an exception handler that is going off into the weeds
  • Reversing the first few bytes of a Master Boot Record (MBR) that may be corrupt
  • Debugging an embedded systems device driver

You can check out the online disassembler here:

http://onlinedisassembler.com/odaweb/


06 March 2014 | 784 views

Target CIO Beth Jacob Resigns After Huge Breach

So the latest news this week is that the Target CIO Beth Jacob has resigned, it seems to be somewhat linked to the massive heist of credit card details from Target that took place in December last year.

To be fair it was a fairly complex, high-level attack and I’m pretty sure most companies would have been infiltrated with a similarly pervasive attack vector.

Beth Jacob - Target CIO

Target CIO Beth Jacob has apparently fallen on her sword in the wake of the massive security breach in mid-December that compromised 40 million debit and credit cards and swept national headlines. Her resignation was rendered this week effective immediately.

“If you look at the history of other large data breaches, turnover at the top of the IT shop is not unusual,” says retail IT consultant Cathy Hotka.

Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel says the retailer is now looking outside the company for a CIO to succeed Jacob and help overhaul its network security, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Ironically, Jacob, who has a sterling reputation among retail CIOs, was thought of as a great hire by Target in 2008, Hotka says.

Target’s security incident — from the sophisticated breach to Steinhafel penning a mea culpa open letter to Target customers to running apologetic ads in the Wall Street Journal and other major publications to Jacob’s resignation — is a watershed moment for retail CIOs. They are now faced with rethinking their data security strategy.

The kind of breach that occurred at Target was highly sophisticated. Hackers slipped their software into Target’s computer systems via credentials stolen from one of Target’s vendors, reported the Wall Street Journal. The software eventually made its way to checkout stations and began amassing credit card data.

Having worked in this industry for many years, it really comes as no surprise how lackadaisical corporate information security can be at times.

And this was a pretty slick multi-level attack coming in at first through a vendor’s access, and eventually landing on the POS terminals – as was the plan from the beginning I would imagine.

“The people who are responsible for these kinds of breaches are well-organized, criminal enterprises,” Hotka says. “If you went to go up to a bunch of retail CIOs and asked them, ‘Could this have happened to you?’ the answer would be, yes.”

CIOs are put in a tough position because they’re not given adequate security funding, Hotka says. She recalls five years ago when the CIO of apparel and home fashions retailer TJX Companies had asked for additional data security resources and didn’t get them. A massive security breach followed, compromising millions of credit card numbers. TJX Companies agreed to pay $40.9 million to resolve potential claims by banks.

Given the growing sophistication of attacks, retail CIOs must now reconsider whether or not managing the risk in-house is wise. As Jacob’s resignation shows, a retail CIO is culpable yet might not have the know-how or resources to protect the company.

So should retail CIOs outsource data security to the experts?

“I think at this stage it’s not unreasonable,” Hotka says.

There’s a LOT of articles going around about this at the moment, many concerning who’s to blame, was it the CIO? who’s fault is it that engineers brought up that they felt there’s a problem? and so on.

Could the CIO have prevented this? Perhaps if she was very technical and on the ground concerning security practice, but honestly there should be a CSO for that and it falls more under the remit of the CTO than the CIO in my eyes.

Source: Network World


04 March 2014 | 2,293 views

EyeWitness – A Rapid Web Application Triage Tool

EyeWitness is a rapid web application triage tool designed to take screenshots of websites, provide some server header info, and identify default credentials if possible.

EyeWitness

The author would love for EyeWitness to identify more default credentials of various web applications. So as you find devices which utilizes default credentials, please e-mail him the source code of the index page and the default credentials so he can add it in to EyeWitness. You can e-mail to EyeWitness [@] christophertruncer [dot] com.

Inspiration came from Tim Tomes’s PeepingTom Script. The author just wanted to change some things, and then it became a thought exercise to write it again himself.

EyeWitness is designed to run on Kali Linux. It will auto detect the file you give it with the -f flag as either being a text file with URLs on each new line, nmap xml output, or nessus xml output. The -t (timeout) flag is completely optional, and lets you provice the max time to wait when trying to render and screenshot a web page. The –open flag, which is optional, will open the URL in a new tab within iceweasel.

Setup

Navigate into the setup directory and run the setup.sh script.

Usage

Examples

You can download EyeWitness here (Or clone the Github repo):

master.zip

Or read more here.


26 February 2014 | 784 views

Apple Retires Support Leaving 20% Of Macs Vulnerable

There’s been a lot of news and scrambling lately related to the Apple SSL vulnerability, and this week Apple announced it would no longer be supporting OS X 10.6 AKA Snow Leopard.

It looks like Lion and Mountain Lion will be supported for a while, and an upgrade to Mavericks is free, so there’s no real reason not to.

The free upgrade path seems to be working fairly well for them, with 42% of all versions of OS X used in January being attributed to Mavericks.

Apple on Tuesday made it clear that it will no longer patch OS X 10.6, aka Snow Leopard, when it again declined to offer a security update for the four-and-a-half-year-old operating system.

As Apple issued an update for Mavericks, or OS X 10.9, as well as for its two predecessors, Mountain Lion (10.8) and Lion (10.7), Apple had nothing for Snow Leopard or its owners yesterday.

Snow Leopard was also ignored in December, when Apple patched Safari 6 and 7 for newer editions of OS X, but did not update Safari 5.1.10, the most-current Apple browser for the OS.

Apple delivered the final security update for Snow Leopard in September 2013.

Traditionally, Apple has patched only the OS X editions designated as “n” and “n-1″ — where “n” is the newest — and discarded support for “n-2″ either before the launch of “n” or immediately after. Under that plan, Snow Leopard was “n-2″ when Mountain Lion shipped in mid-2012, and by rights should have been retired around then.

But it wasn’t. Instead, Apple continued to ship security updates for Snow Leopard, and with Tuesday’s patches of Mountain Lion and Lion Tuesday, it now seems plain that Apple has shifted to supporting “n-2″ as well as “n” and “n-1.”

(In that scenario, Mavericks is now “n,” Mountain Lion is “n-1″ and Lion is “n-2.”)

The change was probably due to Apple’s accelerated development and release schedule for OS X, which now promises annual upgrades. The shorter span between editions meant that unless Apple extended its support lifecycle, Lion would have fallen off the list about two years after its July 2011 launch.

Apple only used to support the current product and the release before that, but Snow Leopard has been supported far longer than that – which indicates they are now probably supporting the current release and the two before that.

Though they haven’t really released any formal statements about support, end of life procedures or timelines. They do have an accelerated release timeline now so it does make sense for them to support more previous releases.

None of this would be noteworthy if Apple, like Microsoft and a host of other major software vendors, clearly spelled out its support policies. But Apple doesn’t, leaving users to guess about when their operating systems will fall off support.

“Let’s face it, Apple doesn’t go out of their way to ensure users are aware when products are going end of life,” said Andrew Storms, director of DevOps at security company CloudPassage, in a December interview.

To Apple, Snow Leopard increasingly looks like Windows XP does to Microsoft: an operating system that refuses to roll over and die. At the end of January, 19% of all Macs were running Snow Leopard, slightly more, in fact, than ran its successor, Lion, which accounted for 16%, and almost as much as Mountain Lion, whose user share plummeted once Mavericks arrived, according to Web analytics firm Net Applications.

With Snow Leopard’s retirement, 1 in 5 Macs are running an operating system that could be compromised because of unpatched vulnerabilities.

Snow Leopard users have given many reasons for hanging on, including some identical to those expressed by Windows XP customers: The OS still works fine for them; their Macs, while old, show no sign of quitting; and they dislike the path that Apple’s taken with OS X’s user interface (UI).

If Apple really wants more corporate/enterprise support – they really need to come out with some formal policies for support and end of life. Also they could really use some enterprise level tools for delivering patches/OS upgrades.

On top of that we also have a whole lot of people who choose not to upgrade for whatever reason (the same folks still using Windows XP) – who will become vulnerable at some point.

Source: Network World